or regulatory arena, but will urge that resources be conserved or protected 

 and that projects and developers be strictly regulated. An advocate is 

 typically quite vocal on behalf of the values it represents and is unwilling 

 to compromise. Usually without statutory authority to prevent by caveat what 

 it views as environmentally harmful projects, it instead reacts to proposals 

 and projects initiated by others. It tends to be well prepared to demonstrate 

 the "correctness" of its viewpoint through its well-developed data gathering 

 and analytical capabilities. It will not hesitate, however, to back up 

 scientific or technical facts with crusading campaigns initiated on behalf of 

 its values. Thus, it attempts to cultivate media and public opinion on behalf 

 of the environment, and typically is associated with environmental 

 "associations" or "clubs." Examples of advocate organizations include the 

 Division of Ecological Services within the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 

 State fish and game departments, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 

 and environmental interest groups, as well as some consumer and health and 

 safety organizations (Beckett and Lamb 1976; Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Lamb 

 1980a; Lamb and Lovrich 1986). 



Guardian Role Type 



At the other end of the goal continuum, guardians attempt to protect the 

 productivity or market utility of resources. They safeguard the traditional 

 ways in which natural resources have been used and managed. A guardian will 

 therefore resist attempts at change that might be urged by advocates or others. 

 Since it is usually possessed of established and influential constituencies, 

 whose interests it must protect, a guardian prefers political strategies to 

 persuade others of the correctness of its view. These political strategies 

 are usually "traditional" logrolling and influence-based processes. Like the 

 advocate, the guardian is also extremely ideological, but in this case, 

 ideology centers around such values as "economic progress" and "developmental 

 benefits." Examples of organizations of this type include the U.S. Bureau of 

 Reclamation; U.S. Forest Service; water conservancy districts; special 

 districts, cities, and counties; the Division of Refuges within the U.S. Fish 

 and Wildlife Service; State departments of parks and recreation; bankers; and 

 various land interests (Beckett and Lamb 1976; Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Lamb 

 1980a; Lamb and Lovrich 1986). 



Role Patterns 



In any instream flow conflict, a variety of organizations become involved; 

 each of these organizations brings with it preferences, both for the outcome 

 and for the arena in which that outcome is to be generated. An organization's 

 preference for outcome is linked to its goals or mission, whereas the 

 procedural preference is related to the resources it has at its disposal to 

 influence the outcome. 



Not every organization holds these preferences to the same degree or in 

 the same order, however. For example, a State department of fish and game 

 may, in any given conflict, prefer to have the decision arbitrated, but it 

 will also prefer a certain type of outcome, presumably one which protects a 

 threatened fishery or establishes a flow regime that meets the ecological 

 requirements of a particular ecosystem. Its behavior, though, will be 



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