The last category of factors that influence organizational power in the 

 instream flow context has to do with the degree and type of clientele or 

 interest group support an organization has, either in terms of its general 

 goals or with regard to one specific issue or set of issues (Lamb and Doerksen 

 1978; Rourke 1976; Clarke and McCool 1985). Relevant considerations here 

 include: How many groups are willing and able to offer support — and to what 

 degree? How cohesive or organized are these groups? How aware are they of 

 the issues involved? How much does the general public tend to support the 

 kinds of goals represented by these groups? And, finally, how politically 

 astute do they tend to be? 



The potential power inherent in these factors determines the type and 

 nature of strategies that will be chosen by the organizations involved, and 

 sets the stage for the intergroup bargaining that will occur. The tactical 

 choices made by the various participants, however, can in turn alter the power 

 relationships and lead to the selection of other tactics. That is, the inter- 

 play between potential bargaining power and tactical action can transform the 

 bargaining outcome, as the groups compete, coalesce, and mutually adjust their 

 various positions (Bachrach and Lawler 1981). Because of the give and take 

 nature of this process, bargaining outcomes on one issue can affect a party's 

 power with regard to another issue — and the overall settlement at one point in 

 time can affect future bargaining outcomes. The process of mutual adjustment, 

 then, has an extremely fluid quality (Rourke 1976; Bachrach and Lawler 1981). 



4.4 PHASE IV: BEHAVIOR ANALYSES 



As indicated in Figure 7, it is in this final phase (Phase IV) that the 

 information gathered in the previous steps is combined and analyzed. It is 

 here that the analyst examines the information as a whole, and attempts to 

 answer the question: What does all of this mean? Rather than looking simply 

 at the authority, role type, and power associated with each individual 

 organization, the analyst looks at the combination of statutory authorities, 

 role types, and power involved. 



There are three general types of questions that must be answered in this 

 part of the analysis. The first of these has to do with the arena in which 

 the decision is likely to be made. In this regard, the analyst surveys the 

 organizations that have been previously identified and examined in the first 

 three phases of the analysis and attempts to determine how many of these will 

 prefer an arbitrated outcome rather than a brokered outcome — or vice versa. 

 It is important to determine the degree of these preferences as well. For 

 example, four organizations may exhibit a preference for a brokered decision, 

 and only two desire an arbitrated solution; these latter two organizations, 

 however, may be more successful in pushing the conflict into the regulatory 

 arena, if their desire to do so is extreme. 



The converse, of course, may also be true. Moreover, those organizations 

 strongly desiring a brokered solution, made in the distributive arena, are 

 much more likely to exhibit behavior that attempts to force participants into 

 that arena. The major considerations here are: (1) the statutory environment 

 surrounding the conflict and (2) the authority each organization has to 

 participate. 



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