Figures 12 and 13 illustrate two different role maps that are similar in 

 one major aspect: each depicts a conflict with few — yet highly polarized — 

 players. All organizations in these examples are extreme in their respective 

 preferences. In this situation — or one like it — an analyst should examine the 

 power of the other player carefully, as well as the behavioral description 

 associated with the subquadrant in which the opponent is located: Powerful 

 players are advantaged in a highly competitive negotiation, and past behavior 

 is frequently a good indication of what is to come. If the other organization 

 is extremely ideological in terms of the type of outcome it seeks to promote, 

 compromise may be difficult, especially when the issues — as may be the case 

 with so few players — are major and limited. Two other facets of the conflict 

 may also be important: the presence/absence of deadlines and the desire of 

 both parties to maintain or enhance their working relationship. An extremely 

 ideological, powerful organization that frequently engages in competitive 

 bargaining can make a powerful opponent, especially in the absence of an 

 urgent need to reach an agreement. An organization preparing to enter a 

 highly competitive negotiation such as this needs to cover a number of bases. 

 This includes developing a set of initial (and high) demands, from which it 

 will be possible to retreat incrementally, as well as a bottomline position 

 beyond which further concessions cannot be made. "Throw-away" items need to 

 be identified — points that can be conceded easily, without damaging important 

 interests. Timely concessions may facilitate reciprocity from the other 

 parties, provided not too much is offered too soon. One can typically expect 

 arguments or threats from the other side, and should be prepared to identify 

 and call the bluffs from the other side. 



It may be preferable, however, to encourage more cooperation. For 

 example, it may be helpful to emphasize the importance of a fair and equitable 

 result, or the need to develop and maintain trusting interorganizational 

 relationships (Eavey and Miller 1984; Gifford 1985). One can also identify 

 the most likely and powerful competitive players, and seek to build a coalition 

 among the other organizations to balance the distribution of power. Coopera- 

 tion is more likely among relatively equal players. 



When the conflict is essentially bipolar, as is the case in Figures 12 

 and 13, and it is difficult to anticipate the outcome, it may be possible to 

 use the "uncertainty" element to persuade the other side to cooperate, rather 

 than risk losing altogether (Hoffman 1958; Mulford and Rogers 1982). Players 

 adopting this tactic, however, need to preserve the perception that a wider, 

 more costly conflict is possible (Hoffman 1968). Another highly persuasive 

 tactic in a bipolar conflict is one of "irreversible commitment." In this 

 case, an organization makes a statement of absolute commitment to a particular 

 policy outcome in such a way that it is clearly understood: either the desired 

 outcome is achieved or all parties lose — through the time and expense of 

 litigation, for example, or from an expansion of the conflict. The threat must 

 be credible, of course, for this tactic to work. The organization extending 

 it must be willing to follow through, or be able to convince the others that 

 it will do so. Ideological extremists and/or very powerful players are most 

 likely to adopt this tactic. It is more likely to work, however, when the 

 decisionmaker is not actively involved in resolving the dispute, or when there 

 is no decisionmaker. In this latter case, agreement among the parties may be 

 mandated by statute. 



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