Figures 14 and 15 illustrate two configurations of organizations likely 

 to engage in cooperative bargaining. In both cases, agreement on process 

 seems certain, and all players are located in moderate positions with respect 

 to the goals preferred by each. 



In Figure 14 the organizations are all located in the upper half of the 

 diagram, indicating a preference for operating in the distributive arena. The 

 essence of distributive policy is the distribution of policy benefits accruing 

 from a policy decision; conflicts typically are resolved in face-to-face 

 negotiations; and compromise between initial positions generally results 

 (Ripley and Franklin 1984). This is especially true, of course, if the groups 

 are ideologically connected in some way (Axelrod 1970; Browne 1973). Since 

 the basis for making a distributive decision differs dramatically from that 

 used in the regulatory arena, however, the analyst should further investigate 

 the types of power each organization has at its disposal. For example, public 

 and constituency support are frequently valued more than data when a decision 

 is to be brokered (Beckett and Lamb 1975; Lamb and Doerksen 1979). Interest 

 groups also play an important role in brokered decisions (Rourke 1976; Smith 

 1985). And finally, an analyst facing this situation must consider the number 

 and types of issues involved, the need for a timely resolution of the conflict, 

 and the ideological preferences of the organizations involved. The more 

 numerous and diverse the issues, and the greater the need for immediate 

 resolution, the more appropriate will be the cooperative strategy. Further- 

 more, organizations that are predicted to exhibit a moderate preference for a 

 particular set of goals are more likely to offer the necessary concessions to 

 make a cooperative negotiation successful . 



In Figure 15, the decision is likely to be arbitrated. In the regulatory 

 arena, information is presented by all parties to a conflict, and the arbitra- 

 tor objectively selects the proposal that appears to offer the "best" solution 

 to the problem (Beckett and Lamb 1975; Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Ripley and 

 Franklin 1984). Data carries more weight here than do the political facts 

 preferred in distributive arenas. Thus, the analyst should examine the power 

 differentials among the organizations. Resource power is reflected by the 

 degree to which an organization is able to fund studies to support its 

 position, its expertise index, and its backing by interest groups. 



One tactic that is useful in a cooperative negotiation is to identify the 

 general boundaries within which all groups agree to work. Flexibility is 

 maintained within these boundaries, however. Those adopting this approach 

 work together to identify those general areas — either procedural or sub- 

 stantive — on which agreement can be reached, and then iron out the specifics, 

 in terms of outcome, as the negotiation proceeds. Two examples are: (1) tacit 

 agreement on the rules of the negotiation process itself, such as "no political 

 appeals to the media, politicians, or currently uninvolved interest groups," 

 "no giving of false or manipulative information," or "no personal attacks;" 

 and (2) tacit agreement on substantive issues, i.e., appropriate methodology 

 or the number and type of alternatives. In this case, however, the opponents 

 must perceive a need to coordinate, but be so ideologically or geographically 

 separate that they are unable to communicate openly with one another (Hoffman 

 1968). 



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