The third approach — integrative bargaining — is demonstrated in Figures 16 

 and 17. In both cases, while there appears to be little or no agreement 

 regarding procedure, all are in agreement on type of outcome. Typically, each 

 side will attempt to pull the conflict into the arena in which it operates 

 most comfortably, and from which it expects to benefit the most. If an inte- 

 grative approach is successful here, however, polarization can be avoided. 

 The probability of success is enhanced in this regard if information is freely 

 exchanged among the parties. The integrative approach works best when there 

 are many and diverse issues and when time is not an important constraint. 

 There must be some possibilities for expanding or creatively manipulating the 

 tradeoff potential; that is, the game must be positive-sum. For example, in a 

 conflict between an endangered fish species' need for additional habitat and 

 the existence of limited opportunities (during spring runoff) for white-water 

 rafting, the rafting opportunities may be relocated to a different river 

 system where rapids are more plentiful, in exchange for the habitat. Since 

 all players in these two cases are in ideological agreement, the opportunities 

 for log rolling and trade-offs across specific issues can be increased in a 

 positive-sum game. 



Three tactics are most helpful in an integrative negotiation, or in a 

 situation where the parties are attempting to engender such a climate. First, 

 the parties brainstorm together to develop objective standards upon which to 

 base the deci sion--and to which all parties agree (Fisher and Dry 1981; Gifford 

 1985). Second, the issues where agreement is most likely are selected and 

 dealt with first. This frequently sets the stage for compromise among the 

 parties and creates an atmosphere of trust. And, finally, before opposing 

 views on the issues solidify, it is important to anticipate major problems 

 before they arise. Here, the parties identify the potential problem areas, 

 where agreement seems most difficult. The groups then work together — perhaps 

 with the help of a neutral third party — to generate a wide range of options 

 for solving the potential problems (Clark and Emrich 1980; Fisher and Ury 

 1981; Gifford 1985). When the issues are many and diverse, moreover, it is a 

 good idea to break them into smaller and more manageable units, and then to 

 work with several issues simultaneously. This increases opportunities for 

 trade-offs among the parties and leads to fairer results than working with one 

 issue at a time. Indeed, working with one issue at a time may not only be 

 inefficient but also tends to increase the potential for conflict among the 

 parties (White et al . 1980). 



These examples are offered to give an analyst an idea of the 

 lizational configurations that may occur in any given conflict, 

 :ypes of negotiations that are likely to result. 



Another possibility that must be considered has to do with the formation 

 of coalitions among the players, not only among the direct participants, but 

 between these organizations and their real and potential interest group allies. 



6.3 COALITIONS 



A coalition is defined here as a set of organizations that pools resources 

 or coordinates activities to pursue common and independent goals. Two related 



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