elements of a resource conflict are worth examining with regard to coalitions. 

 The first has to do with the goals that the various organizations hope to 

 achieve in the conflict. The second has to do with power. 



Although numerous researchers have attempted to identify the factors that 

 increase the likelihood of coalitions forming, the one that appears to have 

 the most empirical validity — and which also seems most relevant to the types 

 of conflicts addressed here — is Axlerod's notion of "minimal connectedness" 

 (Axlerod 1970; Browne 1973). 



Axlerod suggests that coalitions are most likely to form where there is 

 the least amount of conflict of interest among the members. Those organiza- 

 tions having similar values — and goals stemming from those values — have the 

 least amount of conflict of interest among them. Thus, groups (or indivi- 

 duals) tend to coalesce when they are located close to one another along some 

 relevant ideological continuum. This set also tends, however, to be of minimal 

 size; the smaller a successful coalition, after all, the greater is each 

 member's share of the goods obtained and the fewer are the concessions they 

 have to make among themselves (Axlerod 1970). Coalitions do develop that 

 contain numerically unnecessary members. Axlerod indicates that this tends to 

 occur when the unnecessary members are ideologically close to the others. 

 Eavey and Miller (1984) explain in different terms why coalitions arise that 

 contain more members than are absolutely necessary to achieve mutual goals. 

 For these authors, a norm of fairness exists that can move players toward 

 consensus or to include nonessential members in an alliance. It may be helpful 

 to stress this norm where it appears to be operating — or to create it when 

 none exists. Satisfaction with the results is enhanced when all legitimate 

 parties are allowed to participate. This, in turn, increases the likelihood 

 of compliance with the terms of the agreement and decreases the potential for 

 new but related conflicts at a later point in time (Olive and Lamb 1984; Wilds 

 and Lamb 1985). This may be especially true in cooperative and integrative 

 style negotiations, where both fair results and the maintenance of inter- 

 personal and intergroup relationships are highly valued (Gifford 1985). 

 Complementary sources of power also seem to be an important determinant of 

 group inclinations to form or join coalitions (Smith 1985). 



Potential coalitions can be identified from an examination of the role 

 map, subquadrant descriptions, and role indices provided by the model. For 

 example, those organizations located in clusters within the same quadrant are 

 likely to have enough in common to at least consider becoming members of the 

 same coalition. The key factor to examine here, however, is the intensity of 

 organizational preference for one type of outcome over another. Thus, all 

 organizations having either "advocate" or "guardian" as their dominant role 

 type are likely to coalesce with organizations of a similar perspective. 

 Indeed, the stronger the preference for one type of outcome over another, the 

 more extreme will be the behavior of the organization in pursuit of that 

 outcome. Extreme ideological players are deeply committed to the values they 

 represent. These organizations are also most likely to expand the conflict or 

 litigate should the outcome not be in their favor. Thus, the analyst needs to 

 examine the number, type, and distribution of extreme advocate and guardian 

 organizations. Strategies should be developed for dealing with a number of 

 possible scenarios. Three questions that should be answered regarding poten- 

 tial coalitions are outlined below. 



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