On 21 April 1963, a naval officer assigned to 

 Underwater Demolition Team TWENTY TWO, LTJG J.W. 

 Gibson, was attacked and fatally wounded by a shark 

 at the head of Magens Bay, St. Thomas, Virgin 

 Islands. The shark was caught on the following day 

 and positively identified as the perpetrator of the 

 attack by the undigested remains of the victim found 

 in its stomach. 



Personnel of UDT-22, which had been deployed to 

 the Virgin Islands for advanced training, recall 

 that apprehensions about the possibility of shark 

 attack rose sharply after the death of LTJG Gibson. 

 The rationale for the attack most frequently ex- 

 pressed by UDT personnel on scene was that the shark 

 was "sick" and its attack was therefore extremely 

 unusual. 



A training exercise conducted a few days after 

 LTJG Gibson's death, involving diver lock-out from 

 a submarine, was cancelled after two pairs of divers 

 locked-out and reported seeing sharks that appeared 

 aggressive. Operations were not resumed that day, 

 and the submarine returned to port. On the following 

 day the operation was successfully completed, with 

 no sharks sighted. 



During the Fall of 1969, a classified underwater 

 construction project was carried out by divers of • 

 Underwater Demolition Team ELEVEN. In one stage of 

 the project, use of underwater explosives was required 

 on a daily basis. Diving operations were frequently 

 hampered by aggressive behavior of the numerous sharks 

 that unfailingly appeared in the work area after the 

 detonation of the explosives. The sharks congregated 

 in such large numbers after each detonation, and their 

 behavior was so menacing, that resumption of work was 

 delayed up to two hours on several occasions. 



When work was resumed it was necessary to put two 

 pairs of divers into the water; one pair to work and 

 one pair to watch for and ward off sharks that 

 approached too closely. Work dives were often terminated 

 when persistently aggressive sharks forced divers to 

 leave the water. The of f icer-in-charge requested 

 permission to arm his divers with powerheads, but 

 authorization was not granted because of the potential 

 danger to personnel posed by the powerhead itself 

 and concern that the thrashing and bleeding of a 

 wounded shark would serve to attract more sharks. 



c. Countermeasures 



Advisable behavioral countermeasures which should be incorporated into 

 training materials have been set forth in detailed fashion in an ONR 

 report (Baldridge, 1973). 



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