EDITOR'S TABLE. 



237 



resenting him as basing his philosophi- 

 cal system on metaphysical speculations 

 regarding the Unknowable, and as the 

 author of an unknowable philosophy. 

 The article on " German Darwinism " 

 rings many changes on this gross mis- 

 representation. 



The writer says that evolution is 

 regarded by Darwin " as a theorem of 

 natural history," while Mr. Spencer 

 treats of evolution "as a philosophical 

 thesis deductively, and as a part of a 

 system of metaphysics ; " and further- 

 more, " a system like Mr. Spencer's is 

 obliged to stand on such positions," 

 namely, " undemonstrated beliefs." 

 Again, he says, ''Evolution is, with Mr. 

 Spencer, not a theorem of inductive 

 science, but a necessary truth deduced 

 from axioms." These statements is 

 it not almost needless to say it ? are 

 altogether groundless. Mr. Spencer's 

 system never could have taken the hold 

 of the cultivated scientific mind of half 

 a dozen nations in the present age, 

 which it confessedly has, if the above 

 characterization of it were true. Speak- 

 ing of an important research of Mr. 

 Spencer, the President of the Koyal 

 Society of London, when addressing 

 the British Association, said: "I need 

 dwell no further on it here than to 

 quote it as an example of what may be 

 done by an acute observer and experi- 

 mentalist, versed in physics and chem- 

 istry, but above all thoroughly instruct- 

 ed in scientific methods." Testimony 

 like this, that Mr. Spencer, whatever 

 may be his shortcomings, is a master 

 of scientific methods, might be accu- 

 mulated to any extent. Is it probable 

 or conceivable that a man so thorough- 

 ly equipped for their use should repu- 

 diate the sound and solid methods of 

 science, and fly off into baseless specu- 

 lation when dealing with the most 

 comprehensive and important scientific 

 problem of our time ? The thing is 

 absurd unless it is proved, and the au- 

 thor of " German Darwinism " stops 

 with mere dogmatic assertion. 



"We aver, on the other hand, that 

 the scope of Mr. Spencer's great argu- 

 ment for evolution is only equaled by 

 the fidelity and completeness of his ad- 

 herence throughout to the established 

 canons of scientific inquiry, and his 

 reputation as a master of true logical 

 method is beyond doubt mainly due to 

 his practical application of it in the 

 construction of his system. In " First 

 Principles" the law -of evolution is 

 placed upon the most comprehensive 

 inductive basis ; and, if we go back to 

 the earlier enunciation of his views, we 

 find the law propounded with no refer- 

 ence whatever to metaphysical specula- 

 tions. The original form of the concep- 

 tion and the order of its development 

 are seen in the essay on "Progress, its 

 Law and Cause." There is here not a 

 word of metaphysics, not a word imply- 

 ing the endeavor to derive the phenom- 

 ena from the persistence of force, not a 

 shadow of foundation for the alleged the- 

 ologico-metaphysical origin of the doc- 

 trine. The first part of the essay is 

 devoted entirely to establishing the in- 

 duction, from all orders of phenomena, 

 that every thing progresses in heteroge- 

 neity ; and then, the induction having 

 been established as universal, the sec- 

 ond part of the essay is an inquiry into 

 the dynamical law which determines it 

 in all cases. This second part sets out 

 thus : " And now from this uniformity 

 of procedure may we not infer some fun- 

 damental necessity whence it results? 

 May we not rationally seek for some 

 all-pervading process of things ? Does 

 not the universality of the laic imply a 

 universal cause ? " And then the course 

 of the argument is, first, to show that 

 the cause alleged, the multiplication of 

 effects, affords a deductive interpreta- 

 tion of the induction previously estab- 

 lished. Are we to be told tliat this is 

 an illegitimate scientific procedure ? 



The author of " German Darwin- 

 ism" pronounces Spencer unscientific 

 and unbaconian, because he employs 

 the deductive or a priori method. But 



