With parts of the city more than 6 m (20 ft) below sea level, New Orleans depends 

 on levees and drains to protect the populace. A single pump failure, or levee crevasse 

 can be disastrous. The city has learned to cope with these problems(Schneider 1952); yet 

 it was not added to the Orleans Parish Levee District until 1950. With city funds, levees 

 were built on the river. 



After the disastrous flood of 1927, the need for flood control became apparent. To 

 save New Orleans, the levee was blown up creating an artificial crevasse (Simprich 

 1927). The Army Corps of Engineers began to construct the Mississippi's "guide levees." 

 In modern Louisiana these manmade embankments protect cities, towns, villages, 

 farmland, and industrial complexes. In retrospect, they have allowed New Orleans to 

 reclaim commercial, industrial, and residential property. With much of this "new" land 

 below sea level, rain runoff and groundwater seepage is pumped uphill. 



Levee systems are essential to keep flood waters out. Pumps operate continually 

 to remove the excess. With continued urban/industrial expansion into the wetlands, there 

 is a constant problem with subsidence. When drained, the peat land shrinks and subsides 

 by as much as 75%. Developments, therefore, must withstand 3.5 m (12 ft) of subsidence 

 during the first 50 years after drainage and the levees must provide protection from high 

 tides, rains, and hurricanes (Wagner and Durabb 1976). 



As the marsh deteriorates the buffer zone between the Gulf of Mexico and New 

 Orleans narrows. This "cushion" is the city's first line of defense. It serves many useful 

 purposes. As a site for the urbanite to engage in outdoor recreation, it is without 

 parallel. For the people in New Orleans, however, it buffers against a hurricane's storm 

 surge. When this barrier has eroded away, the city is in a most precarious situation, 

 since it has no manmade defenses that can compare to the marsh. With parts of New 

 Orleans more than 6 m (20 ft) below sea level, flooding is a constant problem. Even 

 though the area is drained, the natural system is superceded by an artificial one that, at 

 times, cannot accommodate the torrential rainstorms of the summer months. With its 

 "foreland" eroding, the city is in a dubious position. Since two of the city's immediate 

 marsh neighbors, Plaquemine and St. Bernard parishes, have projected land loss rates in 

 1980 of 3,574 ha/yr (8,831 acres/yr) and 685 ha/yr (1,695 acres/yr), respectively, their 

 marsh's life expectancy are 52 and 152 years (Gagliano 1981). Consequently, the 

 "cushion" is disappearing at an astonishing rate. The data clearly suggest Louisiana's 

 largest urban agglomeration will require substantial new flood protection measures 

 within the next 50 to 100 years, particularly as the area becomes more exposed to open 

 water. 



The Settlers and Their Occupations 



Louisiana's coastal zone has been the site of continuous human occupancy for at 

 least 12,000 years. From prehistoric Indians, to modern communities of French-speaking 

 "Cajuns," the alluvial wetlands have supported a range of cultures and settlements. 

 Numerous ethnic groups colonized the aquatic lowlands, locating their homes and villages 

 on protected and well-drained land, near navigable waterways, and not too far from their 

 fishing, hunting, trapping, and agricultoral areas (Detro and Davis 1974). They 

 established also the region's dependency on wetland resources. 



Unlike New Orleans, the settlers within the wetlands were French farmers, 

 trappers, and fishermen. They regarded the semiaqueous terrain as an attractive 

 location for their new "marsh villages." In addition to the French, a group of Yugoslavian 



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