356 CONCLUDING REMARKS Chap. XIV. 



and wolf have learnt under confinement to imitate the 

 barking of the dog. How the barking of the dog, which 

 serves to express various emotions and desires, and which 

 is so remarkable from having been acquired since the 

 animal was domesticated, and from being inherited in 

 different degrees by different breeds, was first learnt, 

 we do not know; but may we not suspect that imitation 

 has had something to do with its acquisition, owing to 

 dogs having long lived in strict association with so 

 loquacious an animal as man? 



In the course of the foregoing remarks and through- 

 out this volume, I have often felt much difficulty about 

 the proper application of the terms, will, consciousness, 

 and intention. Actions, which were at first voluntary, 

 soon became habitual, and at last hereditary, and may 

 then be performed even in opposition to the will. Al- 

 though they often reveal the state of the mind, this re- 

 sult was not at first either intended or expected. Even 

 such words as that " certain movements serve as a means 

 of expression" are apt to mislead, as they imply that 

 this was their primary purpose or object. This, however, 

 seems rarely or never to have been the case; the move- 

 ments having been at first either of some direct use, or 

 the indirect effect of the excited state of the sensorium. 

 An infant may scream either intentionally or instinc- 

 tively to show that it wants food; but it has no wish or 

 intention to draw its features into the peculiar form 

 which so plainly indicates misery; yet some of the most 

 characteristic expressions exhibited by man are derived 

 from the act of screaming, as has been explained. 



Although most of our expressive actions are innate 

 or instinctive, as is admitted by everyone, it is a dif- 

 ferent question whether we have any instinctive power 

 of recognizing them. This has generally been assumed 

 to be the case; but the assumption has been strongly 



