THE RISE OF A NEW PROFESSION 265 



native talent, trained minds. "Who shall believe that the sea of affairs 

 can be charted, and can be sailed by the aid of eternal principles and a 

 fine exact technique of diplomatic and humane methods, and who shall 

 be at least as much devoted to the ennoblement of their art as to their 

 own advancement. 



Transitional Difficulties 



The new order always evolves out of the old with pain and mis- 

 understanding. The new is long looked upon from the inadequate view- 

 point of the old. The exigencies of the new situation are always upon 

 us before the teachings of the old have been sufficiently deliberated upon 

 to yield a settled philosophy of action. It is not surprising that this 

 generation should be embarrassed in finding new maxims and ideals, 

 while it is yet blinded by the brilliant achievements of the age of the 

 captains of industry. The shadows of the great founders still fall upon 

 the present-day executive in many forms. In one case it is the tradi- 

 tion of methods once successful, and of conceptions and tests once con- 

 sidered adequate. In another case it is embodied as the incompetent 

 heir, invested with an estate and the glamor of a successful name, and 

 set as an amateur to rule over experts. Again, the shadow of a depart- 

 ing order takes the form of a vast enterprise, which was, perhaps, ori- 

 ginally builded with enthusiasm to great size and power, but which is 

 now a shell with many a sheltered spot within, where weak men may 

 vegetate as clerks, perpetually referring matters from one to another, or 

 strong men may be induced to trust to " the impulse of an early start," 

 or to " interlocking directorates/' or " banking control," or " dominating 

 influence on the market," or to " predatory competition," or to anything 

 else than service. 



Perhaps the chief hinderance to the development of the scientific 

 administrator in America will prove to be what we may call the danger 

 of the entrenched position. The significance of this danger was long 

 ago pointed out by Machiavelli, who warned his ideal prince of the 

 harm wrought by strong fortresses. His words, written in 1513, are 

 still full of significance. He said, 



Whenever either princes or republics are afraid lest their subjects should 

 revolt, it results mainly from the hatred of the subjects on account of the bad 

 treatment experienced from those who govern them; and this comes either from 

 the belief that they can best be controlled by force, or from lack of sound judg- 

 ment in governing them. And one of the things that induce the belief that they 

 can be controlled by force is the possession of fortresses with which to menace 

 them; and thus the ill treatment that engenders hatred in the subjects arises 

 in great measure from the fact that the prince or republic hold the fortresses, 

 which (if this be true) are therefore by far more injurious than useful. For, 

 in the first instance, they cause you to be more violent and audacious towards 

 your subjects; and next, they do not afford the security which you imagine. 



And, further, he says: 



