for oil spills, the taxpayer footed most of the bill for this negligent spill. 

 Several other courts have made similar holdings. In re Oswego Barge Corp ., No 

 76-CV-209 (N.D. N.Y., 13 Nov. 1978); United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc ., No. 

 77-2090-E (E.D. La., 26 Oct. 1978. 



Several courts, however, have held that the United States may rely on 

 legal sources other than the FWPCA to obtain full compensation for cleanup 

 costs. In United States v. M/V Big Sam , 454 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. La. 1978), 

 for instance, a District Court in Louisiana held that the United States could 

 recover in maritime tort and under the Refuse Act, as well as under the FWPCA, 

 where a collision between a tugboat and a barge resulted in a spill in the 

 Mississippi River. This court discussed the United States' special responsi- 

 bility to preserve and protect navigable waterways and held that this respon- 

 sibility gave the United States inherent authority to bring a common law ac- 

 tion such as a maritime tort suit. It then went on to construe the language 

 of the FWPCA and its legislative history to show that Congress intended to 

 allow the United States to continue to use the Refuse Act to recover cleanup 

 costs. Other courts have agreed with the Big Sam court. Burgess v. M/V 

 Tama no , 564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 941; United States 

 v. Rohm & Haas Co ., 500 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 962; 

 United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc ., 363 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt. 1973), 

 aff'd, 487 F.2d 1393 (2nd Cir. 1973). 



Thus, the Federal courts disagree on whether the United States can use 

 alternative legal means of obtaining full compensation for cleanup costs when 

 the FWPCA fails to do so. Unless a Superfund is created, as I have already 

 discussed, we may have to resolve this question in the Supreme Court. 



THE PROBLEM OF VALUATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 



I would like to talk now about one of the problems that arises when we go 

 to court to recover damages for harm to natural resources such as recreational 

 or esthetic resources or wildlife: the problem of monetary valuation. In 

 order to recover money for these resources, the court must be convinced that 

 the dollar amount that is requested has some rational basis. This is easy 

 when the United States sues for the destruction of an automobile; the cost of 

 the car is known, and how much it will cost to replace it is also a fixed 

 figure. It is not so simple to put a monetary value on the natural resources 

 under the protection of DOI . What does it cost to replace a dead ruddy duck, 

 or even more difficult, an endangered species, such as the brown pelican? A 

 recent spill in Tampa Bay killed at least four brown pelicans. 



In some senses these animals simply cannot be replaced, and the harm to 

 the ecology of an area cannot be "fixed." This is why the FWPCA is aimed 

 largely at preventing spills rather than cleaning up after the harm is done. 

 But the Act also gives us authority to sue for damages to natural resources. 

 It is DOI's responsibility to use that authority to maintain environmental 

 values and to see that spillers pay the full bill for damage they cause. We 

 presently are working with the U.S. Department of Justice to arrive at a 

 practical system of valuation for natural resources. 



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