readers. During a derailment our firm is under extraordinary stress to 

 effectively deal with the hazardous materials. An inordinate additional 

 amount of stress on our personnel is created by the media. Elected officials 

 who must protect the well-being of the citizens create stress due to their 

 lack of understanding of the ability of the railroad to assist them in pro- 

 tecting the citizenry. Government and industry can reduce this unnecessary 

 stress by coordinating all investigations, problemsolving efforts, and public 

 statements. 



There have been enough accidents with resultant release of product to in- 

 dicate that one of the most visible problems is created by the questions: 

 "Who is in command?" "Who is responsible?" "Who has authority?" These ques- 

 tions are like a plague that besets these accidents. Local, county, State, 

 Federal agencies--each knowing that it has a responsibility, but not realiz- 

 ing what specific functions the others have--go about doing their own things. 

 This confusion must be overcome. As many as 45 people, representing different 

 (and sometimes the same) agencies, have claimed the command authority. Imag- 

 ine the plight of the railroad, being confronted with command decisions 

 issued by all these different agencies. A derailment with product release is 

 tough enough to deal with, but this is ridiculous! Each agency is charged 

 with unique responsibilities, and our company is sensitive to the need to 

 satisfy their demands. The Regional Response Team (RRT) is the vehicle that 

 can bring logical order to this confusion. 



Here is an example of a hazardous materials spill situation. At about 

 8:00 a.m. on 8 April, a 117-car train derailed outside Crestview, Florida. 

 Within minutes, the fire chief had hazard information for each product on 

 board. It was determined which cars were involved and what product each con- 

 tained. Shortly after the derailment, an explosion took place. Some 20 min- 

 utes after the derailment, a second explosion was reported. Up to this point, 

 events within the derailed cars were happening without warning. Simultaneous- 

 ly, the emergency response personnel were taking correct actions regarding 

 evacuation of area residents. But, this is where the actions at Crestview 

 greatly differ from those taken during many other similar incidents. 



The fire chief decided not to commit his personnel to fight the fires or 

 cool tanks. From a safety view, this was the most intelligent decision he 

 could make. Believe me, this decision was difficult to make. 



Environmentally, things generally stacked up as follows: 16 anhydrous 

 ammonia cars, 1 urea, 1 sulfur, 1 carbon tetrachloride, 3 acetone, 4 methyl 

 alcohol, 1 chlorine, and 1 carbolic acid (phenol). The two explosions sent 

 the ends of two anhydrous ammonia cars some 400 feet away on one side and 500 

 to 600 feet on the other. The sulfur was partially gone; some still burned. 

 The chlorine car had been punctured with a large amount of product released. 

 Three to five anhydrous ammonia cars were leaking with varying degrees of 

 severity. To put this in perspective, the incident was within 200 feet of 

 the bank of the Yellow River. Seven different products had been released. 

 After determining that everyone had been evacuated, the main concerns were: 

 a) personnel safety, b) the environment, c) restoration of the railroad, and 

 d) restoration of normal community activity, but not necessarily in that order. 



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