to make a judgment on what the best state-of-the-art procedure is and then 

 mandates its use in damage assessments until something better is discovered. 

 This certainly seems preferable to trying to work with a different damage 

 assessment procedure in each individual spill. 



It should also be noted that in the Chesapeake spill, mentioned pre- 

 viously, not just waterfowl were affected -- 27 miles of wetlands were oiled, 

 many invertebrates were killed, and extensive oiling of oyster beds occurred. 

 Because no established procedures existed to estimate the restoration or re- 

 placement costs or value of these natural resources losses -- again no damages 

 were assessed. 



A significant mortality rate for oysters was found in the oiled area 4 

 years later. Who compensated the oystermen for these losses? No one! If 

 damage assessment procedures were available that required restoration of 

 damaged resources where such resources were replaceable then the unquantifi- 

 able cost might be avoided. The Committee believed it was reasonable to ex- 

 pect a spiller to help restore a damaged area where techniques were available 

 to make it possible. 



In summary then, the theory behind any Superfund legislation should be 

 to provide a response to spills of oil and hazardous materials which makes 

 full compensation to damaged parties in cases where the responsible party 

 is unable to do so. 



We hope that this brief discussion has provided you with some insight 

 into the reasons why the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee in- 

 cluded provisions for damage assessment regulations in S. 2083. We predict 

 that you may be seeing similar provisions again in the future legislative 

 efforts by our Committee and trust that many of you in this group will be 

 involved in both the creation of and implementation of the damage assessment 

 provision that is ultimately approved by our Committee and the Congress. 



161 



