624 THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF INDIVIDUALITY 



which are contingent on a variety of experiences and on conditions within 

 the organism. Because instinctive reactions, memories and sense impressions, 

 previous thoughts and emotions enter as constituents into the type of our 

 behavior and the texture of our thoughts, both behavior and thoughts have 

 become so intricate that for practical purposes they are no longer determined 

 and predictable. Instead of predictability, there arises the appearance of free 

 will. 



In philosophical discussions there are, in its original meaning, two char- 

 acteristic features associated with the concept "individuality." One assumes 

 distinctiveness of the whole, and the second the impossibility of division with- 

 out loss of the individual character. In the latter sense, a primitive animal, 

 consisting of segments which can be separated from each other, without 

 destroying the life and main characteristics of the organism, is less indi- 

 vidualized than a more complex organism in which the parts are more closely 

 knit together and in which a separation of the significant parts is not possible 

 without destroying its individuality and even its life. The individualization 

 of organisms has advanced the further the more integrated the parts are, 

 so that they form one connected whole. 



The bodily mechanism of the more complex organisms is unified into 

 individual wholes especially by the individuality differentials, the nervous 

 system, and the hormones carried by the circulating fluids. The psychical- 

 social individuality is co-ordinated essentially by certain predominant instinc- 

 tive mechanisms and by those conscious processes which center around the 

 "I" thought complex ; but this process of integration at best is imperfect 

 and in various essential respects the psychical organism remains dissociated. 

 But biologists and philosophers have attempted by other concepts to integrate 

 the bodily and the psychical parts of an organism into one whole. There is 

 the concept that a separate agent, not further accessible to analysis, dominates 

 the parts and unifies them into a living organism ; this agent is assumed to 

 exist only in living beings and to differentiate the living from the non-living. 

 Others attribute to the whole, new characteristic features which "emerge" in 

 a manner not to be foreseen, if one considers merely the parts of which the 

 organism is composed or the forms from which the organism has evolved. 

 It is held that the new whole, in a way which is not accessible to further 

 analysis, determines and directs the functions of the various parts and co- 

 ordinates these functions. If a part regenerates the complete organism, it is 

 assumed that the structural plan of the whole determines the regenerative 

 processes. Similarly, according to this view, the end accomplished by the 

 functioning of a system of reflexes determines the formation and mode of 

 action of the reflexes of the functioning whole. Tacitly, thus, an agent endowed 

 with purposeful action is introduced into the organism ; it not only co- 

 ordinates the parts but has helped to create the organism. 



Another hypothesis assumes the existence of a "mneme" as the agent 

 unifying the parts of the organisms. The memory of a preceding change 

 alters the future state and behavior of an organism in a specific manner, 

 which is conditioned by the character of the first change or experience acting 



