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wibaarincs. I tubait i copy for the record sines what wa auggastad i» still 

 partlnant. In tha lattar, wa strongly racoaaandad that aaatings and sita 

 visits should ba arrangad batwaan U.S. and Russian naval officars, civilian 

 aNparts, and intarastad businassaan to saa what couTd ba dona to assist tha 

 Russians solva thair dacoaaissioning and wasta problaa. 



To avoid aora Russian subaarina accidants at saa, wa urgad that tha 

 Unltad Statas stop its nuclaar subaarina oparations. This would ba tha bast 

 way to insura tha Russians kapt thair subaarlnas fro* sailing. Oua to tha 

 currant lack of a substantiva ailitary aission, halting attack subaarina 

 oparations should ba faasibla. As for ballistic aissila subaarinas, in 

 Prasidant Yaltsin's January rasponsa to Prasidant Bush's stata of tha Union 

 addrass, ha notad Russia had alraady raducad its ballistic aissila subaarina 

 patrols, and ha proposad halting thaa antiraly on a autual basis. Raduction 

 in tha alart status of nuclaar forcas and ganaral lasaanad tansions should 

 also allow tha cassation of ballistic aissila subaarina patrols. 



Wa racaivad a quick positiva rasponsa froa Rap. Charlas Bannatt, 

 Chairaan of tha Housa Saapowar Subcoaaittaa, regarding my suggastions for 

 assisting Russia with its dacoaaissioning problaa. Ha has takan ■ leadership 

 position on this issue in the House, realizing there are ecological and 

 ■illtary benefits in having a saaller Russian nuclear-powered subaarina force. 

 Also he has noted that this prograa would not cost the Aaerican taxpayer a 

 penny, as profits froa selling scrap froa subaarinem would covev any aoney 

 lent for this purpose. 



Only in July did we receive a short non-coaaittal response froa the 

 President's office. Unfortunately, this Adainistration is not ready to face 

 this problea. Apparently, the U.S. Navy, and priaarily its nuclaar propulsion 

 prograa, has blocked any attaapts to cooperate with or help their foraar foes 

 to decoaaission their nuclear-powered subaarlnas. This effort extends beyond 

 Just frustrating congressional initiatives. Reportedly* the Navy even has 

 obstructed efforts by private U.S. businessaen to work with the Russians to 

 scrap nuclear-powered subaarlnas. 



The reasons for the U.S. Navy's opposition are apparently several-fold. 

 First, there is a concern that if the Russian Navy followed U.S. suggestions 

 and an accident occurred the United States in soae way would be held 

 responsible. Vet, reportedly, this should not be an Issue, since the Russian 

 Navy has indicated its willingness to assuae full liability. 



Second, the U.S. Navy's subaarina force levels have traditionally been 

 predicated on the size of the Soviet Union's naval forces. As such, helping 

 the Russian Navy to reduce its subaarina force weakens the arguaents for a 

 sizable U.S. subaarina force. 



Finally, the U.S. Navy fears that helping the Russian Navy with their 

 decoaaissloning problaa will inadvertently raise questions about the costs and 

 problaas with the U.S. decoaaissloning prograa. 



Currently the U.S. has soae fifty deactivated or decoaaissioned nuclear- 

 powered subaarlnas. Several nuclear-powered surface ships and probably 



