450 



Tins :j particularly insettling- hecaase 'lie ' _" Nivv knonj 'l.o '-'12 '.iv\ 

 !ias 3 prohlein it ,-annot Iiandle. : S Ri^ar Arlmiral EJ.'.ard ihaefer. Tireclor I' 

 'aval IiitolUg-ence. slightly 'anderestiinatin^ the situation, told Cjngror;; tlus 

 !\'br-jar\' 'Iiat: 



T'.ie ',!S Joes not vet have a solution :'jr iispojal cf nuclear 

 submarine r?actorc. A3 a result, tlie number cl' retired nuclear 

 submarines scrapped ;jnr - rar ill probably remain low. .^nd 'hsrc 

 are already over GO discarded nuclear submarines requiring 

 proper _tora:ic and disposal, posing a _;rov. ;n^ jn vironraental 

 problem for the Russians, m u hose harbors they are lying. 



A first simple and inexpensive step towards assisting Russia — since 

 the US Navy faces parallel problems in decommissioning its own nuclear- 

 powered , jbmarines — -oulJ be to arrange a series ul' meetings between the 

 responsible CIS naval officials and IS Navy officers to share technical 

 ■xpertise and develop a program of how to proceed. Interested IS iiaval 

 experts and businessmen could also be included m these discussions. 



Mutual visits to each countries submarine shipyards could also be part 

 of the aid program. In particular. Russian officials could be brought to Puget 

 Sound Naval Shipjard and Hanl'ord. Washington, to observe the IS Navy's 

 decommissioning procedures. Visits to the Severodvinsk submarine building 

 facility on the White Sea, and the Bolshoi Kamen submarine facility near 

 Vladivostok in the Pacific would be particularly useful. 



A short list of what will be needed to help Russia could be developed 

 relatively quickly. There is clearly a need for advanced metal cutting 

 -echnology, heavy-Lift cranes, and construction of land-storage areas for 

 submarine reactors and their compartments. US public expenditures for these 

 items could he minimized by providing credit against revenue raised from the 

 scrapping of the non-radioactive parts of submarines. 



As a next stage, a comprehensive reciprocal exchange of information and 

 inspections could be arranged, so that we can fully understand the extent of 

 the decommissioning problem. This should include: 



- mutual inspection of shipyards, and exchange of environmental data on 

 the state of the shipyards, and the health records of their orkers. 



- exchange of information on the state, size and operation of the 

 nuclear-powered naval forces, submarine operating bases, land-based 

 prototype and training reactors, naval reactor fuel fabrication facilities. 

 and nuclear and radioactive waste processing and storage sites. Mutuad 

 and reciprocal visits to facilities should be planned. Information on 

 past submarine radiological accidents should be exchanged. 



- development of bilateral or multilateral programs for environmental 

 monitoring of navcd nuclear submarine facilities and past areas of ocean 

 dumping of naval nuclear v aste. Specific attention should be paid to 

 the area off ^'ovaya Zemlya where the Soviet Navy dumped submarine 

 nuclear reactors. 



