480 



INTERNATIONAL — July 1992 JANE S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW J3I 



three ol which have not been raised 

 namely the November submarine in 

 1970 the Yankee m 1986 and the Mike 

 in 1989 



Oindusions 



The large Soviet nuclear submarine force 

 was thought to be a ma|Or threat to 

 NATO s navies However a diHerent view 

 ol the Soviet submarine threat is 

 beginning to emerge The reports about 

 accidents and material problems indicate 

 the Soviet Navy may have had problems 

 keeping an adequate number o( 

 submarines safe and operational As 

 more information .emerges, on balance il 

 may shown to have threatened its own 

 sailors as much as it did Western navies 



What IS interesting is the persistence of 

 safety problems Clearly early Soviet 

 nuclear submarines regularly suffered 

 from accidents One ol the first was 

 reportedly nicknamed Automat because 

 It took the submarine only one day to 

 return alter an accident Another was 

 dubbed Half-Automa' because it spent 

 two days at sea before malfunctions 

 forced It back to port' Sadly 

 improvements over time were not 

 lorthcoming Four mapr disasters 

 occurred m the 1980s the modern Mike' 

 submarine sank in 1989 the second- 

 generation Yankee submarine sank m 

 1986 the second-generation Victor 

 submarine exploded in 1985, and the 

 second-generation Charlie submarine 

 sank in 1983 



Several Russian reports survey safety 

 problems that have existed lor some 30 

 years The learning/feedback loop 

 between design, production and 

 maintenance does not seem to have 

 been adequate Although technically 

 advanced submarines were produced, 

 design Haws, construction delects, poor 

 crews and in3dequate niaintenance, 

 taken individually or collectively, 

 seriously affected the safely of the force 



The prospects for improvements in the 

 future are not gbod With decreasing 

 resources impairing training, added to 

 the unavailability of materials, then the 

 chances of accidents occurring may 

 even increase tn October 1991. one 

 Vladivostok naval officer went so tar as to 

 say. in principle, and in practice . the 

 possibility of accidents like the 1985 

 disaster could not be excluded 



References 



1 Arkm w and Handler J Naval Accidents 

 1945-88 Neptune Papers l^ 3 

 Greenpeace Inslilule lor Policy Studies. 

 June 1989. Bussen J. The Safety of Soviet 

 Nuclear Submarines Janes Oelence 

 Weekly 18 April 1987, pp 715-719; 

 Breemer J S. Soviel Submarine 

 Accidenis Background and Chronology', 

 Navy Internaiiortal. May 1986. Kaplan E 



and Oinkelspiel F The Soviet Navy s Long 

 History ol Nuclear Accidents Center lor 

 Investigative Reporting. 12 Inarch 1985 



2 House Appropriations Committee (HAC) 

 FY 1986 (XIO Appropriations Hearings 

 Pan 2 p 928 See also Senate Armed 

 Services Commiitee(SASC) FY 1986 

 OOO Authorization Hearings, Part 8 

 p4359 



3 Baldwin H Navy Spurs Study ol Undersea 

 Warfare Soviet Submarine Progress is 

 Key in Plan lor Ocean Surveillance 

 System New York Times 5 November 

 1961 



4 Admiral DeMars B Prepared Siaiemenl 

 before the Seapower and Strategic and 

 Critical Materials SuDcommiiiee ol the 

 House Armed Services Committee 

 (HASC) 7 April 1992 p 8 



5 CIA Directorate ol Operations Domestic 

 Collection Division Foreign Intelligence 

 Inlormation Reports on Soviel Submarine 

 Accidents partially released under trie 

 Freedom of inlormation Act in December 

 1984 to Ihe Center lor Investigative 

 Reporting San Francisco, CA, HASC, 

 Hearings on Naval Nuclear Propulsion 

 Program — 1982 29 April 1982 pp 18- 



19 



6 See in particular Emelyanenkov A F From 

 Ihe SoOesednik Files — Split Atom The 

 First 50 Years Sobesednik Nk) 12. March 

 1992 



7 Captain 3rd Rank Gladkevich Yu 

 Nuclear -Powered Ships in the Bay Is this 

 Dangerous for People and the 

 Environment' Krasnaya Zveida 20 

 Decemi3€r 1990 (Translated m JPRS-UMA 

 1 February 1991 pp 49-50) The incident 

 took place at the Gomyak nuclear 

 submarine shipyard on Krashenimnkova 

 Bay near PelropaviovskKarrKrhatskii 



8 Emergency at a Military Submarine 

 Facility in Severodvinsk , Interlax News 

 Agency reporting Irom the Arkhangel sk 

 based newspaper Pravda Severa (FBIS- 

 SOV. 4 Kiovember 1991 p 4t Transmitted 

 via Kyodo Nevirs Service) 



9 Emelyanenkov A F From the Sobesednik 

 Files — Split Atom The First 50 Years 

 Sobesednik. No 12 March 1992 



10 Interview with Admiral ol the Fleet. 

 Makarov K by Captain 1st Rank Pihpchuk 

 Is the Navy Accident Rate High' 

 Krasnaya Zvezda 2 February 1991 

 (Translated in JPnS-UMA-91-010 12 April 

 1991. p 39) 



11 Interview with Rear Admiral Zatula V Chief 

 of the Ship Combat Training Department 

 o) the Navy, and his deputy Candidate ol 

 ttie Military Sciences. Capiam 1st Rank 

 Oobrovolkiy V. Military Reform — 

 (^oWems and Opinions Krxnnjnist 

 Vooruzttefmykh Sil. No 1 , January 1991 

 (Translated m JPRS- UMA.91-013, 20 May 

 1991. p 47) 



12 Cotonel o> Justice (Reserve) Romanov N. 

 Captain 1st Rank Khraptovich. and 

 Emelyanenkov A F, 'Without Hope tor 

 Escape? Reasons for High Accident Rate 

 inttwNavy'. Izvestrya. 12 July 1991. 

 (Translated m JPRS-UMA-9 1-021. 7 

 August 1991. p 53) 



1 3 Caplain 2nd Rank Stelanovskiy V Chief 

 Engineer ol the Sevastopol Ship Repair 

 Yard in Wnimgs Damage-Control 

 Quarters Znamya r^to 9 September 

 1990 (Translatedin JPRS-UMA- 91002 



14 January 1991 pp 18-25) 



14 Captain 1 SI Class BystrovS, Loss ol 

 Nuclear Powered Vessels Tne 

 Undercurrents II Revealed Krasnaya 

 Zvezda 15 March 1990 (Translatedin 

 FBIS-SOV 90-054 20 March 1990 pp 90- 

 92) 



15 Androsenkov Resiricied Cily Will Those 

 People Who are Obligated To Do So Turn 

 and Face me People With a Dillicuii 

 Fate' Ratxxnaya Tnouna 23 June '990 

 pp 2-3 (Translated m JPRS-UMA.90-023 



15 October 1990 D 57 ) 



16 Captain 3rd Rank Gladkevich Yu How 

 Nuclear Submarines Originate Krasnaya 

 Zvezda 29 June 1991 (Translated m 

 JPRS-UMA-9 1020 25 July 1991 o67) 



1 7 Colonel ol Justice (Reserve) Romanov N 

 Captain 1st Rank Khraptovich A and 

 Yemelyanenkov A Without Hope lor 

 Escape' Reasons tor High Accident Rate 

 m the Navy izvesiiya 12 July 1991 

 (Translated m JPRS-UMA-9 1 -02 1 7 

 August 1991. pp 53-55) 



18 Caplain-Lieutenani Puteyev K Readers 

 Ask Nonstandard Nuclear Submarines 

 Krasnaya Zvezda 7 May 1991 

 (Translated m JPRS-UMA-9 1-015 



21 June 1991 pp5i-52) For a 

 discussion flow Ihe design and crowded 

 nature ol Soviet submarines contnbuies to 

 problems m preventing and controlling 

 fires see Rear Admiral (Reserve) Prolessor 

 Kostev G and Capiam 1 si Rank Kosiev 

 Deputy Commander ol a Submarine Unit 

 The Fleet Today and Tomorrow Why Do 

 Compartments Bum'' Krasnaya Zvezda 

 15 February 1991 (Translated m 

 JPRS-UMA-9 1-012 3 May 1991 

 pp 55-56) 



19 These collisions are worth noting since the 

 incidents may have sparked malfunctions 

 in equipment Alter a Goll submarine 

 srugged a Japanese lishmg ixiat s net m 

 Sepiemtwr 1984 a lire may have resulted 

 m the submarine due to stressed 

 equipment 



20 The K-219 could have had continual 

 problems as it also suffered a missile iut)e 

 accident m August 1973 



21 One nuclear submarine a Charlie class 

 which sank o« Peiropavtovsk m 1983 was 

 raised Two tnore sinkings ol unknown 

 nuclear submarines one in (December 

 1979 m the Atlantic and one in September 

 1983 in ttie Pacific were reported by 

 Bussen J in The Safety ol Soviet Nuclear 

 Submarines Janes Oelence Weekly 



18 April 1987. p 715 It has not been 

 othenmse corroborated Admiral Aleksm V 

 Chief Navigator oi ihe CIS Navy loid ihe 

 author in February 1992 m Moscow that 

 only tlwee nuclear submarines fiave sunk 

 which have not been raised 



Joshua Handler is a research co- 

 ordinator with an international 

 environmental organization 



