587 



alarming. The beginnings of ^^'Pu escape can be expected in 1995-1996. The uncontrollable 

 process of plutonium escape could occur in pulses and last several years. This could create a zone 

 of stable contamination by ^^'Pu corrosion products, which will be both highly active and chemi- 

 cally toxic, on the bottom near the NS. 



The Polar Institute of Marine Fishery and Oceanography (PINRO) has made assessments of 

 the potential economic damage due to ^^'Pu contamination of sea products. Commercial fish can 

 be expected to be contaminated to levels double the allowable limit for ^^'Pu. Moreover, in addi- 

 tion to the heavy economic damage (up to 2.5 billion rubles in 1991 prices), negative political re- 

 action by the Scandinavian countries will inevitably follow. 



The most radical preventive measure would be to raise the NS. The costs of such an opera- 

 tion would exceed 250 million U.S. dollars. Existing damage to the pressure hull and continuing 

 corrosion could make salvage impossible. 



Local sealing could impede the rapid release of radionuclides. One proposed method of seal- 

 ing the NS is to pump in a gel consisting of 1-2% chitosan (an active absorber of heavy metal 

 salts). The gel would undergo polymerization in the presence of calcium contained in seawater, 

 forming a glassy substance (which would not erode quickly even in strong currents), and practi- 

 cally completely prevent radionuclides from entering the external environment for decades. 



Yet another alternative solution to the problem is to detach and raise only the NS's bow sec- 

 tion containing the torpedo tubes (or only the torpedo tubes) and the NWH's they contain (with 

 subsequent destruction or disposal of the warheads). 



If any of these alternatives were selected, systematic radioecological monitoring at the resting 

 place of the /ro/n5o/wo/e/j would remain mandatory. International participation in such monitoring 

 must be expanded. 



3.6. Conclusion 



Direct measurements of the radioactivity of surface seawater in areas used for LRW disposal 

 have shown no dangerous rise in levels of radioactive contamination over backgrounds. 



At sites of direct disposal of the most hazardous SRW (reactors with SNF in place), no ob- 

 servations have been made since 1967. Now, a quarter of a century later, such observations must 

 be made immediately. With this aim, a full-scale expedition must be organized this very season 

 (summer 1993) to inspect the condition of sunken objects in inlets of the eastern coast of Novaya 

 Zemlya and the Novaya Zemlya Depression. The expedition plans must include all SRW disposal 

 areas, in both northern and far eastern seas. 



The organization of radioecological monitoring at RW disposal sites must be done jointly by 

 the Navy, the Russian Ministry of Nature and Roskomgidromet. For objects proven to be a radio- 

 ecological hazard, the Russian Navy, Committee for Special-Purpose Underwater Work 

 (KOPRON), Ministry of Atomic Energy and Ministry of Nature must develop a plan of measures 

 to raise them to the surface and subsequently dispose of them on shore. 



Fleet hydrographic services must establish the precise coordinates of sunken large objects and 

 show their position on maps and in piloting books. 



To assess the radiological consequences of RW disposal at sea, scientific research should be 

 initiated immediately concerning a) the radionuclide composition of sunken objects and the condi- 

 tion of their protective barriers, and b) the uptake of radionuclides by food chains and dose bur- 

 dens in water life. 



A thorough study of the radionuclide budget of ecosystems in northern and far eastern seas 

 should also be assigned. 



45 



