Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 97 



to ^'bowed to Smith," as predicate. Between the two there is 

 perceived a fellowship, a mutual belonging, a relation of part 

 to part (of a single mental whole), the relation expressed by the 

 60-called copula, as holding between subject and predicate. 

 Now, gi'anted this predicate, plainly the subject, in order to 

 maintain this belonging, must adapt itself to whatever the predi- 

 cate requires. Conversely, the predicate, forcing the subject to 

 do this, may be regarded as its liniiter, determiner, or restricter. 

 Accordingly the ordinary subject-predicate analysis, constantly 

 urged by Grammar and Logic, fits the present case. But the 

 present case is one only of many, with the remainder of which 

 this analysis w^ill not avail. These remaining cases I will bring 

 together under 



(b) The relative word is not the subject of the relative clause. 



This case presents itself in many varieties, of which I propose 

 to examine a few only of the more conspicuous. To illustrate, 

 '^The guest whom Smith saluted is my nephew." In this sen- 

 tence also I think it undebatable that my purpose in saying 

 "whom Smith saluted," is the same as it was in savino; "who 

 bowed to Smith," namely, to confine jour attention to a partic- 

 ular giiest, although in the present illustration "guest" is no 

 longer subject in the relative clause. The usual analysis, how- 

 ever, no longer meets requirements. If I regard my relative 

 clause as consisting of a subject "Smith" and a predicate "sa- 

 luted the guest" (here again by no means "whom"), I not only 

 receive no aid, but am actually hindered from seeing the opera- 

 tion of restrictive elements. For the blending of "saluted" and 

 "guest" in a single total precludes that discreteness of "guest" 

 which I require in order to feel its adaptation of itself to its fel- 

 lows. So also the separation of "Smith" and "saluted" breaks 

 the totalitv in which I wish to view them as a restricter of 

 "guest." I must plainly conceive the analysis of thought more 

 largely than is customary either in Logic or in Grammar. I 

 advance accordingly these general propositions: A thought 

 mav be analvzed into any one of its ideas and the remainder; 

 betweeen that one and the remainder may be conceived that 

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