Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 83 



Suppose now I elect to omit the principal thought, namely, that men 

 are mortal, expressed by "Es-Homin sunt mortales." As I have sought 

 to indicate, its disappearance does not involve the loss of the idea 

 named by "homin" or of the symbol "homin" itself. That is, the drop- 

 ping of the principal clause has not affected any structural element of 

 the relative clause. Far from disappearing, "homin" steadfastly holds 

 its place. 



It cannot then be said that "qui" or "who" is left without a meaning. 

 In the first place "who" never had a meaning. In the second place the 

 meaning required by Grammar is present in "homin" or "men," 

 which does not disappear from either my thought or my sentence. 



That "men" may be forced to disappear must be conceded. All of 

 my example might no doubt be suppressed except "who are animals." 

 But to such suppression I object as excessive. The severance of the 

 principal, including its share in a common subject, is no doubt legiti- 

 mate. But such amputation, like that proposed by Shylock, must draw 

 no blood. Much more then must it not cut off any member of the rela- 

 tive body. It must leave to the relative clause its share of the common 

 subject. Properly then the relative clause consists of "Homin-qui sunt 

 mortales." 



It appears accordingly, that the relative clause as well as the 

 principal contain the simultaneous factor. The symbols of all 

 other required meanings it also sujDplies. It does not therefore 

 depend upon the principal for any part of its meaning. While 

 the relative word is a convenient formal means of recognizing 

 the relative clause, the latter in strict analysis consists of what 

 Grammar calls the antecedent, plus the isolated inflection, plus 

 associated words. Thus in ^'I met Brovvm, who is ill," the 

 relative clause is ^'Bro\^Ti (who) is ill," ^*who" being merely the 

 nominative case ending peculiar to the secondary membership 

 of a simultaneous factor. 



(d) Ttvo units may have more than one common factor, but one only 

 is made simultaneous. 



Given "A stone struck Brown" and "A stone hurt Brown," I may say 

 that "A stone which struck Brown hurt him," or "A stone struck Brown 

 whom it hurt;" but I may not say that "A stone struck Brown whom 

 which hurt;" and much less may I say "A stone struck Brown yester- 

 day on the shoulder, which hurt whom when where." 



It is obvious that a simultaneous factor directly links the wholes of 

 which it is a part. To this proposition it is merely corollary to add 

 that two thoughts, if linked directly each by a simultaneous factor to a 

 third, are indirectly linked each to the other. It is further conceivable 



