Owen — Revision of Pronouns. 41 



The fact that the so-called ct^^ecedent is often really a posfcedent, is 

 alone sufficiently embarrassing to invite the use of another name. The 

 suggestion offered by the grammatical term is also quite illusive, tend- 

 ing to reverse the prestige of principal and proxy. To call the former 

 the antecedent, that is, the preceder, offers somewhat such a slight as 

 to call the kite the forerunner of its tail or the Sistine Madonna the 

 precursor of its chromolithographic effigy. 



Again, the vicarious word is said, like the relative, to "refer" or 

 "relate" to its initiative original. Without emphasizing the fact that 

 the proxy, in its frequent precedence of its principal, strictly /);-olates, 

 I raise the fundamental objection, that referring and relating give no 

 hint of what in fact linguistically happens. To illustrate, suppose that, 

 having said to me "Brown is ill," you add "He is going abroad," 

 Grammar will have it that "He" "refers" or sends me back to "Brown." 

 But in thought I cannot go backward. The succession of my mental 

 states and activities runs in one direction — forward. It is impossible 

 for me really to return to one of them, v\fhen once it has lapsed. My 

 "breakfast today may be exactly like my breakfast of yesterday, 

 but in eating it I do not go backward or revert; at most I repeat. 

 So, too, I may think today essentially what I thought yesterday, but 

 I do not really go back even in thought; I do not revert; I merely 

 think again today what I thought the day before. There Is, then, no 

 sending backward of the thinker and no going back, of course, on the 

 part of the word. 



The presentation of an idea hj a vicarious word is a mere in- 

 cident of symbolism. This incident, of extreme importance to 

 the study of symbols, is unimportant to the study of thought. 

 Whether I say ^^Brown thinks he is ill," or ^'Brown thinks Brown 

 is ill," my thought may be regarded as the same. Concentrat- 

 ing attention now on thought, and in particular on the thought- 

 element illustrated by ^^he," I note that the idea presented by 

 such a word is used as a thought-factor once when presented 

 initiatively and again when presented vicariously; that is, the 

 idea symbolized by principal and proxy appears in the minds of 

 speaker and hearer twice at least. The following theory of 

 "relatives" consists essentially of the proposition that, so far as 

 an idea be sjTnbolized by merely an ^^antecedent" and a "rela- 

 tive," that idea is thought but once. 



