American Forestry 



VOL. XX 



NOVEMBER, 1914 



No. 11 



FRENCH FORESTS IN THE WAR 



ZONE 



By Samuel T. Dana 



WHEN the history of the 

 present European war comes 

 to be written, it will prob- 

 ably be found that the 

 forests of the regions involved have 

 played a much more important part 

 than is suspected by the ordinary 

 reader. A hint of this is contained in a 

 German news despatch of October 14, 

 which read, "Heavy fighting continues 

 in the Argonnes. Our troops are mov- 

 ing through dense underwood in very 

 difficult ground with siege trains for 

 use against the fortifications. The 

 French troops offer obstinate resistance, 

 firing from trees where machine guns 

 are posted." 



It is stated that this same forest of 

 Argonne, which has been the scene of 

 such vigorous and continued fighting 

 during the present war, enabled the 

 French to repulse the Prussian attack 

 of 1792, and nearly eighty years later, 

 in 1870, at the time of the Franco- 

 Prussian war, concealed the maneuvers 

 of the Germans before their crushing 

 defeat of the French in the battle of 

 Sedan. To the westward the forest of 

 Orleans is said to have given the French 

 the opportunity of rallying for their 

 final stand in 1871; while to the cast- 

 ward the forest of Soignes, by the shelter 

 which it offered to Wellington's forces, 

 contributed to the defeat of Napoleon 

 at Waterloo. 



That the French Government itself 

 recognizes the forests as a means of 

 defense is shown by a provision in the 

 Code Forestier, adopted in 1829 and 

 still the forest law of the land, that 



private owners can be prevented by the 

 Government from clearing away forests 

 at the frontier wherever these are 

 deemed necessary for defensive purposes. 

 There can be no question but that they 

 are in fact a decided advantage to the 

 army having possession of them. First 

 of all they offer a serious obstacle to the 

 advance of the enemy. Troops can not 

 march nor can artillery trains be trans- 

 ported rapidly through dense woods, 

 particularly when it is possible to block 

 the few roads leading through them by 

 fallen trees. In Alsace, so I was in- 

 formed by an eye-witness, the first step 

 taken by the Germans after the declara- 

 tion of war was to barricade every road 

 as effectively as possible in this wa}'. 

 Presumably the French did the same 

 thing in their own country wherever 

 they were forced to retreat. That the 

 blockades established in this way were 

 effective in checking the advance and 

 wasting the strength of the enemy can 

 hardly be questioned. 



Furthermore, the forest forms an 

 excellent shelter from which an army 

 can fire upon an advancing enemy, while 

 itself remaining in comparative securit3^ 

 It is easy to imagine an infantry or a 

 cavalry charge across an open plain 

 against an opposing army entrenched 

 on the edge of a forest being repulsed 

 with tremendous loss. On the other 

 hand, there would be situations, par- 

 ticularly in level country, where the 

 forest would present a serious obstacle 

 to artillery fire, and considerable areas 

 have probably already been cut over, 

 in this as in other wars, to afford a 



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