FISHERIES, GAME AND FORESTS. 463 



2. That the relator, The Forest Commission, is not a body corporate and must act in the names 

 of the individuals composing it. 



This motion was granted without considering the merits and on the specific ground in each case 

 "that the relator, The Forest Commission, has no power or authority in a case like this to obtain or 

 prosecute such writ." 



William P. Caniuvll for appellant. The orders are appealable to this court. (People ex rel. v. 

 AfcCarthy, 102 N. Y. 631 ; People ex rel. v. Comrs., etc., 97 \. Y. 3;.) The proceeding is on 

 behalf of, and in the name of, the People of the State of New York. (L. 1885, ch. 283, § 11.) The 

 forest commission is a governmental agency — a unit, acting as a corporation acts, by and through its 

 aggregate character. Its powers are given, not to the commissioners, but to the commission. Its 

 duties are imposed, not upon the individuals who compose it, but upon the commission itself. 

 (Code Civ. Pro. §^ 605, 13 13, 2146; L. 1893, ch. 43 ; 23 N. Y. 224 ; 54 Barb. 145; 7 Lans. 220; 

 People v. Turner, 145 N. Y. 45 I.) No valid objection can be raised upon the ground that the forest 

 commission and the comptroller, both being the servants and agents of the State, cannot antagonize 

 or oppose each other in an action, or that a certiorari cannot be used by one department of the State 

 government to review the action of another. (2 Jacob's Fisher's Dig. 1756, 1768; Code Civ. Pro. 

 $2120, subd. 2.) The argument " that any action or proceeding which the forest commission is by 

 law authorized to prosecute must be so prosecuted either in the name of the People of the State, or in 

 the names of the individuals composing the commission," is untenable. (People ex rel. v. Coleman, 

 41 Hun, 307 ; People ex rel. v. C/wlwell, 6 Abb. Pr. 151 ; People ex rel. v. Cook, 62 Hun, 303.) 



Frank E. Smith for respondent. The orders of the General Term are not appealable to this 

 court. (People ex rel. v. Stilwell, 19 N. Y. 531 ; People ex rel. v. Tax Comrs., 85 N. Y. 655 ; 

 People ex rel. v. ffill, 53 N. Y 547; People ex rel. v. Comrs., ete., of Brooklyn, 103 N. Y. 370.) 

 The appeal to this court abated on the repeal of the law which created the forest commission. (L. 

 1895, ch. 395 ; Code Civ. Pro. H 1298, 1930.) The writs were properly quashed by the General 

 Term as improvidently granted. (Code Civ. Pro. %k 1929, 2127, 2129, 2130; People ex rel. Comrs. 

 of Land Office, 135 N. Y. 447 ; L. 1885, ch. 283, * 11 ; L. 1893, ch. 332, ^ 112 ; Siiprs. of Galway 

 V. Stimson, 4 Hill, 136; People ex rel. v. Bd. of Comrs., 97 N. Y. 37.) No questions relating to 

 the merits of the orders made by the comptroller are now before this court. (Code Civ. Pro. » igi ; 

 Lake\. Gibson, 1 N. Y. 188; Wilkins v. Earle, 46 N. Y. 358; Hackettw. Belden, 47 N. Y. 624; 

 Delaney v. Brett, 51 N. Y. 78 ; Peterson v. Swan, i 19 N. Y. 662.) 



Bartlf.TT, J. This appeal calls upon us to determine the powers of the forest commission under 

 the original act of its creation (Chap. 283, Laws of 1S85) and subsequent legislation upon the same 

 subject. 



A brief statement of the facts will make clear the situation which led to the institution of these 

 proceedings. At a tax sale in 1877 the comptroller bought in the property in question, being a part 

 of the present forest preserve, and in June, 1881, executed a deed to the State, which was recorded 

 on the 8th of June, 1882, in Franklin County. 



In March, 1887, the People of the State of New York commenced an action in the Supreme 

 Court against one Benton Turner to recover the possession of a quantity of saw logs cut by him upon 

 the premises in question. While this action was pending in April, 1890, the defendant Turner, 

 claiming to be the owner of the premises, applied to Comptroller Wemple to cancel the State's title 

 under the sale of 1877 and the subsequent deed from the comptroller. This application was opposed 

 before the comptroller by the forest commission on the ground that the pending action against 

 Turner would determine the question of title between him and the State. Comptroller Wemple, 

 following this suggestion, postponed the hearing. 



In April, 1891, this action was decided in favor of the State, and the record therein was filed with 

 the comptroller by the counsel for the forest commission, who insisted that the judgment was a 

 complete answer to Turner's application. Comptroller Wemple's term of office expired on the 31st 

 day of December, 1891, and on that day he made the order canceling the State's title on Turner's 

 original application. 



Two preliminary objections to the hearing of this appeal are made by the respondent. 



