nSHEKlES, GAME AND FORESTS. 465 



commission shall have the care, custody, control and superintendence of the forest preserve." The 

 subsequent provisions of the act confer numerous and detailed powers upon the commission, but those 

 bearing upon this case are to be found in section 11, which provides, among other things, as follows: 

 " The forest commission may bring, in the name or on behalf of the People of the State of New 

 York, any action to prevent injury to the forest preserve or trespass thereon, to recover damages for 

 such injury or trespass, to recover lands properly forming part of the forest preserve, but occupied or 

 held by persons not entitled thereto, and in all other respects for the protection and maintenance of 

 the forest preserve, which any owner of lands would be entitled to bring." The section proceeds to 

 confer upon the commission detailed powers in bringing actions for trespass, and then closes as 

 follows: " With the consent of the Attorney-General and the Comptroller, the forest commission 

 may employ attorneys and counsel to prosecute any such action, or to defend any action brought 

 against the commission or any of its members or subordinates arising out of their or his official conduct 

 with relation to the forest preserve. Any attorney or counsel so employed shall act under the 

 direction of and in the name of the Attorney-General. Where such attorney or counsel is not 

 so employed, the Attorney-General shall prosecute and defend such actions." 



It will thus be observed that the commission is given the absolute care, custody, control and 

 superintendence of the forest preserve, and are authorized for its protection and maintenance to bring 

 any and all actions and proceedings which an owner of land would be entitled to institute. The 

 commission may retain counsel with the consent of the Attorney-General and Comptroller, and if 

 this is not done, it is made the duty of the Attorney-General to act in their behalf. 



The act clearly contemplates not only actions brought by the commission in the name of the 

 State, but actions against the commission or any of its members or subordinates arising out of their 

 official action. 



It is difficult, when we consider these sweeping provisions, to believe that it was not the intention 

 of the legislature to clothe the commission with the amplest and most complete powers to represent 

 the State in the forest preserve. 



It would seem that when the title of the State, acquired at a tax sale, is canceled for any reason, it 

 should be entitled to invoke the remedy accorded the individual suitor, which is the right to review, 

 by certiorari, proceedings which led to the cancellation. 



The party aggrieved in this proceeding is the State of New York, and the writ of certiorari has 

 been sued out in the name of the State on the relation of the forest commission. The respondent 

 urges that this is not a proceeding in the name of the State. We are of opinion that it is, and that 

 the forest commission stands as the representative of the State and acts as relator in this proceeding 

 merely to conform it to the ordinary procedure in respect to form. 



The case of People v. Turner, referred to in the opening of this opinion, was affirmed in this court 

 (145 N. Y. 451), and it was there held that the State was placed in constructive possession of the 

 lands in question through the comptroller's purchase and deed, but that subsequently it was in actual 

 possession by reason of the creation of the forest commission and the powers and duties devolved upon 

 it by the act of 1885. The possession of the commission is the possession of the State. 



It has been the general policy of the State in recent years to confine applications for cancellation 

 of titles /o the purchaser at the tax sale, aiT\dL the creation of the forest commission, with the ample 

 powers conferred upon it, was designed, among other things, to protect the state against improper 

 and unlawful applications of the comptroller to set aside titles. 



It was essential that the State should be represented by a board having full power to protect and 

 maintain its rights in the wild and unsettled portion of the State embraced within the limits of the 

 forest preserve. 



These views lead to the conclusion that the writs were improperly quashed. As the learned 

 General Term quashed the writs on the ground that the forest commission had no power to prosecute 

 them, the orders appealed from should be reversed, with costs, and the proceedings remitted to the 

 Appellate Division to hear them on their merits. 



All concur. 



Orders reversed. 



