JOHN CODMAN ROPES. 633 



but in these latter days Ropes became much more chary of his time and 

 subjected himself to a kind of discipline in order that his work might be 

 finished. 



In another direction and in dealing with a more limited theme, he 

 achieved a finished piece of work. He had always entertained a warm 

 admiration for the First Napoleon. It was natural that such an acute 

 military critic should admire such transcendent military genius. But 

 Ropes carried his admiration to an extent with which not all his friends 

 found it easy to sympathize. In his little book entitled "The First 

 Napoleon" Ropes appears as the great Corsican's advocate, and his case 

 is presented with consummate skill. It has all the more weight because 

 the author is far too skilful to weaken his case by over statement or by 

 any too conspicuous warmth of enthusiasm. It is a masterly piece of 

 writing, although in its philosophic grasp of the man and the period it is 

 surely far inferior to the book published about the same time by the late 

 Sir John Seeley. 



It was in relation to the Waterloo Campaign that Ropes produced the 

 completely finished work already alluded to. No battle of the nine- 

 teenth century has called for so much discussion as Waterloo ; and most 

 of the discussion has centred about the question, " Why did Napoleon 

 lose the battle? " The books on this subject are legion, and they present 

 us with an English view of the situation and a Prussian view, and ever so 

 many French views, according to the political and personal predilections 

 of the writers. Usually we find some particular antecedent selected as 

 explaining the mighty result, while other antecedents receive inadequate 

 attention or are passed over. One writer is impressed with the ineffi- 

 ciency of Grouchy, another one traces the catastrophe to the aimless 

 wanderings of Erlon's corps on the sixteenth of June, and so on. But in 

 Ropes' monograph what chiefly impresses us is the fact that he weighs 

 every circumstance with the greatest care and puts real mental effort 

 into the work of estimating the precise share which each circumstance 

 took in the general mass of causation. In the first place the quality of 

 the French army is duly considered and compared with the quality of the 

 allied forces. Then such facts as the Emperor having Soult for Chief of 

 Staff, an unaccustomed position for that able marshal, his feeling it nec- 

 essary to leave at Paris the invincible Davoust, and other like circum- 

 stances, receive due attention. The mysterious movements of Erlon, 

 which prevented his being of any use either to Ney at Quatre Bras or to 

 Napoleon at Ligny, are more acutely analyzed than in any other book. 

 Then the consequences of the very incomplete defeat of Blucher on the 



