OF ARTS AND SCIENCES : MAY 14, 1867. 289 



say, " A has the common characters of all things," inasmuch as there 

 are no such common characters. 



Thus substance and beinjr are the beginning and end of all con- 

 ception. Substance is inapplicable to a predicate, and being is equally 

 so to a subject. 



§ 5. The terms " precision" and "abstraction," which were formerly 

 applied to every kind of separation, are now limited, not merely to men- 

 tal separation, but to that which arises from attention to one element 

 and neglect of the other. Exclusive attention consists in a definite con- 

 ception or supposition of one part of an object, without any supposi- 

 tion of the other. Abstraction or precision ought to be carefully dis- 

 tinguished from two other modes of mental separation, which may be 

 termed discrimination and dissociation. Discrimination has to do mere- 

 ly with the essences of terms, and only draws a distinction in meaning. 

 Dissociation is that separation which, in the absence of a constant 

 association, is permitted by the law of association of images. It is the 

 consciousness of one thing, without the necessary simultaneous con- 

 sciousness of the other. Abstraction or precision, therefore, supposes 

 a greater separation than discrimination, but a less separation than dis- 

 sociation. Thus I can discriminate red from blue, space from color, 

 and color from space, but not red from color. I can prescind red from 

 blue, and space from color (as is manifest from the fact that I actually 

 believe there is an uncolored space between my face and the wall) ; 

 but I cannot prescind color from space, nor red from color. I can dis- 

 sociate red from blue, but not space from color, color from space, nor 

 red from color. 



Precision is not a reciprocal process. It is frequently the case, 

 that, while A cannot be prescinded from B, B can be prescinded from 

 A. This circumstance is accounted for as follows. Elementary con- 

 ceptions only arise upon the occasion of experience ; that is, they are 

 produced for the first time according to a general law, the condition 

 of which is the existence of certain impressions. Now if a conception 

 does not reduce the impressions upon which it follows to unity, it is a 

 mere arbitrary addition to these latter ; and elementary conceptions do 

 not arise thus arbitrarily. But if the impressions could be definitely 

 comprehended without the conception, this latter would not reduce 

 them to unity. Hence, the impressions (or more immediate concep- 

 tions) cannot be definitely conceived or attended to, to the neglect of an 

 elementary conception which reduces them to unity. On the other 



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