292 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 



p and b. We may imagine one of them to be turned over on the 

 line of writing as an axis, then laid upon the other, and finally to be- 

 come transparent so that the other can be seen through it. In this 

 way we shall form a new image which mediates between the images 

 of the two letters, inasmuch as it represents one of them to be (when 

 turned over) the likeness of the other. Again, suppose we think of a 

 murderer as being in relation to a murdered person ; in this case we 

 conceive the act of the murder, and in this conception it is repre- 

 sented that corresponding to every murderer (as well as to every mur- 

 der) there is a murdered person ; and thus we resort again to a medi- 

 ating representation which represents the relate as standing for a cor- 

 relate with which the mediating representation is itself in relation. 

 Again, suppose we look out the word homme in a French dictionary ; 

 we shall find opposite to it the word man, which, so placed, represents 

 homme as representing the same two-legged creature which man itself 

 represents. By a further accumulation of instances, it would be found 

 that every comparison requires, besides the related thing, the ground, 

 and the correlate, also a mediating representation which represents the 

 relate to be a representation of the same correlate which this mediating 

 representation itself represents. Such a mediating representation may 

 be termed an interpretant, because it fulfils the office of an interpreter, 

 who says that a foreigner says the same thing which he himself says. 

 The term representation is here to be understood in a very extended 

 sense, which can be explained by instances better than by a definition. 

 In this sense, a word represents a thing to the conception in the mind 

 of the hearer, a portrait represents the person for whom it is intended 

 to the conception of recognition, a weathercock represents the di- 

 rection of the wind to the conception of him who understands it, a 

 barrister represents his client to the judge and jury whom he influ- 

 ences. 



Every reference to a correlate, then, conjoins to the substance the 

 conception of a reference to an interpretant ; and this is, therefore, the 

 next conception in order in passing from being to substance. 



Reference to an interpretant cannot be prescinded from reference 

 to a correlate ; but the latter can be prescinded from the former. 



§ 10. Reference to an interpretant is rendered possible and justified 

 by that which renders possible and justifies comparison. But that is 

 clearly the diversity of impressions. If we had but one impression, it 

 would not require to be reduced to unity, and would therefore not 



