294 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 



its being prescinded from reference to a correlate. Hence there are 

 two kinds of relation. 



1st. That of relates whose reference to a ground is a prescindible 

 or internal quality. 



2d. That of relates whose reference to a ground is an unprescindi- 

 ble or relative quality. 



In the former case, the relation is a mere concurrence of the corre- 

 lates in one character, and the relate and correlate are not distin- 

 guished. In the latter case the correlate is set over against the relate, 

 and there is in some sense an opposition. 



Relates of the first kind are brought into relation simply by their 

 agreement. But mere disagreement (unrecognized) does not consti- 

 tute relation, and therefore relates of the second kind are only brought 

 into relation by correspondence in fact. 



A reference to a ground may also be such that it cannot be pre- 

 scinded from a reference to an interpretant. In this case it may be 

 termed an imputed quality. If the reference of a relate to its ground 

 can be prescinded from reference to an interpretant, its relation to its 

 correlate is a mere concurrence or community in the possession of a 

 quality, and therefore the reference to a correlete can be prescinded 

 from reference to an interpretant. It follows that there are three 

 kinds of representations. 



1st. Those whose relation to their objects is a mere community in 

 some quality, and these representations may be termed Likenesses. 



2d. Those whose relation to their objects consists in a correspondence 

 in fact, and these may be termed Indices or Signs. 



3d. Those the ground of whose relation to their objects is an im- 

 puted character, which are the same as general signs, and these may 

 be termed Symbols. 



§ 15. I shall now show how the three conceptions of reference to a 

 ground, reference to an object, and reference to an interpretant are 

 the fundamental ones of at least one universal science, that of lojric. 

 Logic is said to treat of second intentions as applied to first. It would 

 lead me too far away from the matter in hand to discuss the truth of 

 this statement ; I shall simply adopt it as one which seems to me 

 to afford a good definition of the subject-genus of this science. Now, 

 second intentions are the objects of the understanding considered 

 as representations, and the first intentions to which they apply are the 

 objects of those representations. The objects of the understanding, 



