OF ARTS AND SCIENCES : MAY 14, 1867. 295 



considered as representations, are symbols, that is, signs which are at 

 least potentially general. But the rules of logic hold good of any 

 symbols, of those which are written or spoken as well as of those 

 which are thought. They have no immediate application to likenesses 

 or indices, because no arguments can be constructed of these alone, 

 but do apply to all symbols. All symbols, indeed, are in one sense 

 relative to the understanding, but only in the sense in which also all 

 things are relative to the understanding. On this account, therefore, 

 the relation to the understanding need not be expressed in the defini- 

 tion of the sphere of logic, since it determines no limitation of that 

 sphere. But a distinction can be made between concepts which are 

 supposed to have no existence except so far as they are actually 

 present to the understanding, and external symbols which still retain 

 their character of symbols so long as they are only capable of being 

 understood. And as the rules of logic apply to these latter as much 

 as to the former, (and though only through the former, yet this charac- 

 ter, since it belongs to all things, is no limitation,) it follows that logic 

 has for its subject-genus all symbols and not merely concepts.* We 

 come, therefore, to this, that logic treats of the reference of symbols in 

 general to their objects. In this view it is one of a trivium of con- 

 ceivable sciences. The first would treat of the formal conditions of 

 symbols having meaning, that is of the reference of symbols in general 

 to their grounds or imputed characters, and this might be called formal 

 grammar; the second, logic, would treat of the formal conditions of the 

 truth of symbols ; and the third would treat of the formal conditions 

 of the force of symbols, or their power of appealing to a mind, that is, 

 of their reference in general to interpretants, and this might be called 

 formal rhetoric. 



There would be a general division of symbols, common to all these 

 sciences ; namely, into, 



1° : Symbols which directly determine only their grounds or imputed 

 qualities, and are thus but sums of marks or terms ; 



* Herbart says : " Unsre sammtlichen Gedanken lassen sich von zwei Seitcn 

 betrachten ; thcils als Thiitigkeiten unseres Geistes, theils in Hinsicht dessen, was 

 durch sie gedacht wird. In letzerer Beziehung heissen sie Beyriffe, welches Wort, 

 indem es das Beyriffene bezeichnet, zu abstrahiren gebietet von der Art und Weise, 

 wie wir den Gedanken empfangen, produciren, oder reproduciren mogen." But 

 the whole difference between a concept and an external sign lies in these respects 

 which logic ought, according to Herbart, to abstract from. 



