HORACE GRAY. 629 



of courts he delighted in. It is literally true, 1 believe, that, without 

 notice, he could have discharged in any American or English court the 

 duties of any officer from crier to chief justice, so that his example would 

 have profited the regular incumbent. He had been a model reporter of 

 the opinions of others, and he aided greatly those who reported his own 

 opinions. The ordinary judge, wisely enough, leaves clerical details to 

 his clerk, and refuses to burden his mind with them. Judge Gray 

 thoroughly respected a good clerk, and was outspoken in his commen- 

 dation when he found one ; but he always directed his clerk in nice 

 technicalities, and a good clerk knew the value of his direction. His 

 standard of decorum was high. He perceived that faults of deport- 

 ment, insignificant in themselves, when often repeated may bring a court 

 into real disrespect. As head of the judiciary of Massachusetts, he had 

 to maintain by example the dignity of lesser men as well as his own. 

 If his masterfulness and a certain quickness of temper made him not 

 always tactful in his rebukes, it must be remembered that the leaders of 

 the bar were the sufferers, and that a beginner was often helped by his 

 exceptional kindness and gentleness. The rule by which he ordered his 

 own actions was severer than that which he applied to the conduct of 

 others. " While any capital case was on trial before him, in the days 

 when such trials were had in the Supreme Judicial Court, he never took 

 part in any social function or entertainment. He was once heard to say 

 that he believed that, when a man's life was at stake, the judge pre- 

 siding at the trial should give himself entirely to the cause before him, 

 and that during the trial, while not in court, he should hold himself 

 aloot from the ordinary distractions of the world, and keep his mind in 

 contemplation only of the responsible and serious duty which he was 

 performing." * 



These matters of detail, important as he deemed them, were not 

 allowed to encumber his administration of the law. His kuowledge of 

 the elaborate system of equity was used to give relief to a deserving 

 suitor, not to delay or deny justice. In his administration equitable 

 remedies, such as injunctions, were used to make good the defects of the 

 common law, not sold, like common-law writs, for a fee to the clerk. 

 On the other hand, he developed and extended those remedies when a 

 new need called for a novel exercise of the jurisdiction of the chancellor. 

 He was an historical rather than a philosophical lawyer. As he himself 

 put it in one of his earliest opinions, " This subject illustrates the wisdom 



* Memorial of the Boston Bar Association, p. 13. 



