The Philosophy of Evolution. 53 



tive addition of a new attribute, different and distinct from 

 any or all previously existing. One species cannot pass into 

 another by an innate impulse, for a species is an entity com- 

 posed of a determinate number of attributes, and all attributes 

 potentially present must be considered as actually present. 

 We cannot say that the child is a different species from the 

 man, and that one passes into the other by a process of evolu- 

 tion, because all the essential attributes of the man are poten- 

 tially present in the child. If the polyp, by the action of in- 

 nate forces, operating through a series of ages, however ex- 

 tended, can, without any impulse from without, develop itself 

 into a man, then the polyp is as much a man as a boy is, dif- 

 fering only in the time required for development : and the 

 data for the final deduction of the highest types of creation 

 must be furnished in the most elementary forms of life. 



The force manifesting itself in organic life is readily distin- 

 guishable from the organism by which it is manifested. Life 

 and organization are not synonyms; one is the condition of 

 the other, but a condition is not a cause. We can consider 

 force apart from organism, and this possible separation in 

 thought proves that the same form may not represent both, 

 but that life can absolutely exist apart from organs which serve 

 to give it a physical manifestation.* Physical life being con- 

 ditioned upon organization, whenever the organism varies, the 

 vital force thus manifested must also vary, such variation 

 being necessarily antecedent to its manifestation. The organ- 

 ism varies, because it must, in order to express the added 

 thought. Change in organism, therefore, is not induced by 

 simple organic action, because the organs and the force acting 

 through them can be distinguished. Assuming that matter is 

 the objective or formal representation of thought, there can be 

 no change in the material expression without a correspondino- 

 change in the antecedent conception. There can, then, be 

 physical evolution, only as there is antecedent logical evolu- 



*As in the case of man after the death of the body. 



