320 BOARD OF AGRICULTURE. 



care " in the night. Less watchfulness and vigilance would make 

 " ordinary care " in the day time. 



Fires. 



As to fires which farmers must necessarily set. If a man wilfully 

 sets a fire upon his own land, or upon the land of another, with 

 the intent to commit an injury, he is liable for all damages any- 

 how, and probably, in some form, criminally. But in all forest 

 regions like these, it becomes necessary at times to set fires for 

 the proper clearing of the lan(]. The old statute of 1840 says 

 that a man may set fires, in a proper, prudent manner, and must 

 watch and guard them afterwards, for necessary purposes, and be 

 protected, but be holden for any deviation from that rule. The 

 statute of 1857 is substantially the same, and I suppose the 

 new statute of 1870 will not be essentially different. You may set 

 fires for necessary purposes — to burn over a felled piece, to burn 

 up the stumps, rubbish, and other material upon your land ; but it 

 should be a reasonable necessity. Fires should never be set for 

 amusement, any more than the public highways should be used for 

 wrestling. You may travel upon the highway, but if you go there 

 to indulge in sports, and get your necks broken by reason of de- 

 fects in the way, there is no remedy against the town. So you 

 must not set fires except for necessary purposes. In a proper 

 way and prudent manner, you may set fires. Not at a time when 

 it shall be absolutely safe ; not at a time when j'ou would put your 

 life or soul's salvation at stake that no injury would ensue, be- 

 cause no man would ever dare to set a fire in that case ; but when 

 men of ordinar}^ prudence aud care would deem it reasonably safe 

 to set fires, and then you should exercise such watchfulness and 

 vigilance in watching and guarding such fire as a man of ordi- 

 nary care and prudence would do, considering the great injury 

 which might residt from any neglect in that particular. 



It is hardly possible for a lawyer to decide upon a particular 

 statement what would be regarded as a suitable time to set a fire, 

 lie knows the law precisely as he knows the multiplication table, 

 but there is such a vast range of discretion with a jury as to 

 whether a fire has been set at a proper time or an improper time, 

 that it is impossible for him to foretell the event of a suit. The 

 rule makes a jury of twelve men entire autocrats of the whole 

 question, and I have been inclined to the opinion that some of the 

 hardest verdicts have been rendered against men in this matter of 



