MATTER 275 



particles, the changes of position of which we associate 

 with certain relative motions. In other words, to appeal 

 to the conception of elasticity is only to " explain " one 

 " action at a distance " by a second " action at a distance." 

 If the ether- elements owe their elasticity to such an 

 arrangement, we shall want another ether to " explain " 

 the motion of the first, and the process will have to be 

 continued ad infi)iitui}i. Clearly the phenomenalisation 

 of the ether is absolutely useless as a means of explaining 

 why matter moves. It still leaves us with the same 

 problem in another form : Why does ether-matter move ? 

 And here no answer can be given. We cannot proceed 

 for ever " explaining " mechanism by mechanism. Those 

 who insist on phenomenalising mechanism must ultimately 

 say : " Here we are ignorant" or, what is the same thing, 

 must take refuge in matter and force. According to 

 Paul du Bois-Reymond, the problem of action at a 

 distance is the third Ignorabinius} but the problem is 

 really identical with that of Emil du Bois-Reymond's 

 first Ignorabimus, the nature of matter and force. 



It seems to me that we are ignorant and shall be 

 ignorant just as long as we project our conceptual chart, 

 which symbolises but is not the world of phenomena, into 

 that world ; just as long as we try to find realities corre- 

 sponding to geometrical ideals and other purely conceptual 

 limits. So long as we do this we mistake the object of 

 science, which is not to explain but to describe by con- 

 ceptual shorthand our perceptual experience. When we 

 once clearly recognise that change of sense-impression is 

 the reality, motion and mechanism the descriptive ideal, 

 then the Brothers du Bois-Reymond's first and third 

 problems and their cry of Ignorabimus become meaning- 

 less. Matter and force and " action at a distance " are 

 witch-and-blue-milk problems (p. 22), if mechanism be 

 purely a conceptual description. What moves in con- 

 ception is a geometrical ideal, and it moves because we 

 conceive it to move. How it moves becomes the all- 

 important question, for it is the means by which we 

 ^ See the work cited on our p. 38. 



