LIFE 339 



ness seems to indicate that this complexity of the organ- 

 ism is to be sought in the inception and development of 

 its capacity for storing sense-impressions. We can mark 

 where this storage fails, we can mark where it exists ; but 

 where it exactly begins we can hardly determine. This 

 apparent continuity has led to some rather metaphysical 

 reasoning on the part of biologists seeking for a distin- 

 guishing characteristic between living and lifeless groups. 

 As in some types of life consciousness may be evolved, 

 it is argued that there must be in life " something-which- 

 is-not- yet-consciousness-but- which -may-develop-into- con- 

 sciousness," and to this something Professor Lloyd Morgan 

 has given the name of metakinesis} This metakinesis does 

 not appear to be more than a metaphysical name for non- 

 conscious life, for there is no sense-impression that we 

 have of such life that we can describe as metakinetic. 

 Metakinesis is as intangible as the germ-plasm of the 

 biologist or the molecule of the physicist, but less con- 

 ceptually valuable as it describes no phenomenal side of 

 life except the fact that it may or may not be associated 

 with consciousness. Those who believe that the organic 

 has been developed from inorganic, that living has pro- 

 ceeded from dead " matter," may then assert that there 

 must be in matter "something-which-is-not-yet-life-but- 

 which-may-develop-into-life," and may fitly term this side 

 of matter super materiality. It is quite true that we have 

 no direct series of sense-impressions to which this super- 

 materiality corresponds, but as we mark some forms of 

 matter associated with life (just as we mark some forms 

 of life associated with consciousness), so we have the same 

 reason for postulating its existence as we have in the case 

 of metakinesis. How metakinesis develops from super- 

 materiality will of course be the next stage in metaphysical 

 investigation ! 



Now I hope that Professor Lloyd Morgan will not 



think I am laughing at him, for this is far from being the 



case. I believe that no biologist is so patient with the 



physicist, even when the latter waxes paradoxical ; and I 



^ See in particular his letter to Nature, vol. xliv. p. 319. 



