342 THE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE 



both conceptually by the motion of inorganic corpuscles ? 

 The only answer that can be given to this must be that 

 the nature of the motions by which we conceptualise 

 organic and inorganic phenomena are very different. We 

 mean by mechanism something more than the conceptual 

 description of change by aid of the motion of physical 

 corpuscles ; we mean that this motion is itself summed up 

 in the laws of motion discussed in the preceding chapter. 

 Herein lies the apparent kernel of the problem. Before 

 we assert that life can be described mechanically, we 

 must determine whether the motion by which we concep- 

 tualise organic phenomena can be resumed in the same 

 laws as the motion by which we conceptualise inorganic 

 phenomena. 



But we soon find that we are only at the beginning 

 of our investigation. In Chapter VIII. we have seen 

 that the complex laws of motion which hold for particles 

 of gross " matter " do not necessarily hold throughout the 

 whole range of physical corpuscles ; they vary in character 

 and probably increase in complexity from ether-element 

 up to particle. We cannot therefore, without further 

 consideration, determine what are the laws of motion 

 which are to be postulated of the organic corpuscle, if life 

 is to be dealt with as a mechanism. The laws which 

 describe the motion of two groups of molecules are not 

 necessarily the same as those which describe the motion 

 of two isolated molecules, or of two atoms. If the laws 

 by aid of which we might describe the motion of ideal 

 organic corpuscles were found to differ from those which 

 describe the motion of particles of heavy " matter," it 

 would not settle the problem as to whether we could 

 describe life mechanically or not. 



The atomic system by which we conceptualise even 

 the simplest unit of life is far too complex to allow, in the 

 present state of mathematical analysis, of any synthesis of 

 its motions in the presence of other systems by which we 

 conceptualise either living or lifeless " matter." We can- 

 not at present assert that the peculiar atomic structure of 

 the life-germ and its environment, or field (p. 286), would 



