ments in actual militarv material and devices. Basically there is no reason 

 to believe that scientists of other countries will not in time rediscover every- 

 thing we now know which is held in secrecy. A broad dissemination of 

 scientific information upon which further advances can readily be made 

 furnishes a sounder foundation lor our national security than a policy of 

 restriction which would impede our own progress although imposed in the 

 hope that possible enemies would not catch up with us. 



During the war it has been necessary for selected groups of scientists to 

 work on specialized problems, with relatively little information as to what 

 other groups were doing and had done. Working against time, the Office 

 of Scientific Research and Development has been obliged to enforce this 

 practice during the war, although it was realized by all concerned that it 

 was an emergency measure which prevented the continuous cross-fertilization 

 so essential to fruitful scientific effort. 



Our ability to overcovie jwssihle future enemies defends upon scientific 

 advances which will proceed more rapidly with diffusion of knowledge than 

 under a policy of continued restriction of knowledge now in our possession. 



Need for Coordination 



In planning the release of scientific data and experience collected in 

 connection with the war, we must not overlook the fact that research has 

 gone forward under many auspices — the Army, the Navy, the Office of 

 Scientific Research and Development, the National Advisory Committee for 

 Aeronautics, other departments and agencies of the Government, educational 

 institutions, and many industrial organizations. There ha\'e been numerous 

 cases of independent discovery of the same truth in different places. To 

 permit the release of information by one agency and to continue to restrict 

 it elsewhere would be unfair in its effect and would tend to impair the 

 morale and efficiency of scientists who have submerged individual interests 

 in the controls and restrictions of war. 



A part of the information now classified which should be released is 

 possessed jointly by our allies and ourselves. Plans for release of such 

 information should be coordinated with our allies to minimize danger of 

 international friction which would result from sporadic uncontrolled release. 



A Board to Control Release 



The agency responsible for recommending the release of information from 

 military classification should be an Army, Navy, civilian body, well grounded 

 in science and technology. It should be competent to advise the Secretary 

 of War and the Secretary of the Navy. It should, moreover, have sufficient 

 recognition to secure prompt and practical decisions. 



To satisfy these considerations I recommend the estahlishmcnt of a 

 Board, made up equally of scientists and military men, whose function would 

 he to pass upon the declassification and to control the release for puhlication 

 of scientific inforviation which is now classified. 



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