hostilities. Many men must remain overseas, some in armies of occupation, 

 others awaiting the provision of faciHties for their return. Educational facilities 

 must be provided for them during this period. Very recent techniques de- 

 veloped in our laboratories in connection with the prosecution of war devel- 

 opments can and should be made available in the Army universities overseas 

 to qualified men in order that they may thereby be enabled to return to this 

 country with as modern and advanced approach to some of the subjects of 

 moment as they would have had if they had remained here during the war, 

 or if they had been selected for early return and re-entry into universities in 

 this country. To accomplish this not only must the information be available 

 in printed form, but men familiar with latest developments should be chosen 

 as instructors in the Army universities. 



The returning soldier who wants to pick up his interrupted plans for a 

 career as a scientist or engineer deserves access to the very latest develop- 

 ments and techniques. It will be a tragedv for him and for the country if he 

 is trained in the light of the knowledge of 1940 rather than 1945. Because of 

 the war we have lost several classes of scientists and engineers, both under- 

 graduate and graduate. The gap can never be entirely filled, and it can be 

 successfully narrowed only if the classes graduating in the immediate postwar 

 years can be trained in advanced developments and techniques. We must 

 overcome, not aggravate, the effects upon science and upon the country as a 

 whole of the wartime loss of several classes of scientists. 



These considerations merit emphasis in addition to those mentioned in the 

 President's letter of November 17. 



2. Release from Military Classification 



The first, and most important, step is to obtain the release of scientific 

 material from its military classification as soon as conditions permit. Basically 

 there is no reason to believe that scientists of other countries will not in time 

 re-discover everything we now know. A sounder foundation for our national 

 security rests in a broad dissemination of scientific knowledge upon which 

 further advances can be more readily made than in a policy of restriction 

 which would impede our further advances in the hope that our potential 

 enemies will not catch up with us. The Committee believes that, with few 

 exceptions, our national interests require the release of most of our war- 

 acquired scientific information as soon as it is evident that our enemies will 

 not be able to turn that information against us in the present war. It further 

 believes that most of this information can be released without disclosing its 

 embodiments in actual military material and devices. 



Research has gone forward under many auspices, the Army, the Navy, the 

 National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the Office of Scientific Re- 

 search and Development, various other Government departments and many 

 industrial establishments and academic institutions. In many cases there 

 have doubtless been independent discoveries of the same truth in different 

 places. To permit the release of information from one place and restrict it 

 from another would not only be unfair but would impair the morale and 

 efficiency of scientists who have readily subscribed to the policy of restriction 

 dictated by war needs. 



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