Commissioner of Agriculture. 99 



tionally authorize the infliction of a penalty to be recovered in 

 a civil action and of punishment to be inflicted in a criminal 

 court, are readily distinguishable. 



People v. Stevens, 13 Wend., 341, was decided in 1835. In that 

 case (p. 342) the Legislature specifically declared that the viola- 

 tion should not only be punishable by the infliction of a penalty, 

 but should also be deemed a misdemeanor and punishable by 

 fine and imprisonment. In that case the penalty to be recovered in 

 a civil action and the criminal prosecution were not authorized 

 by one and the same statute or section of the law. Finally the 

 statutes there under consideration were enacted prior to the 

 Constitution of 1821, which first contained the prohibition 

 against double jeopardy. 



In Rollins v. Breed, 54 Hun, 485, the statute specifically said 

 that there might be both causes of action — one in favor of any 

 individual who might sue, and the criminal action in favor of 

 the people. The court on this ground alone distinguished the 

 case from the Federal authorities cited heretofore in our brief, 

 which decisions they apparently approved of and reconciled with 

 the case then before the court on the ground that the govern- 

 ment cannot maintain two causes of action. The opinion says 

 of the McKee case, 4 Dillon, 128: 



" The McKee case differs somewhat from the present one. 

 There were two separate statutes, each furnishing a complete 

 remedy for the charge. The government chose to enforce one, 

 and it might be well said that a conviction and punishment 

 under that ended the right of the government." 



It may be noted that the same distinction was applied in the 

 Federal Courts in the case of Stone v. United States, 167 U. S., 

 178. 



In People v. Meehim, 133 N. Y., 214, the matter was referred 

 to merely by way of dictum. The prior action in that case more- 

 over was not a mere civil action to recover a penalty, but a 

 mandamus to remove a public officer, and was held to be not in 

 the nature of a criminal action. 



Even if these authorities were irreconcilable with those of 



