INSTINCT AND REASON. 285 



being affected by a particular kind of emotions. All mental 

 powers are thus, in short, nothing more than names deter- 

 mined by the various orders of mental phenomena." Again 

 he says, "The end of philosophy is the detection of unity." 

 And again, " The faculties are special modifications under which 

 consciousness is manifested." 



Such, in brief, are some of the views held by several 

 writers on mental science, relative to the oneness or unity of 

 the mind itself, and the nature of what are called the faculties 

 of the mind. Not altogether unlike these in the human being, 

 is the mind with its manifestations in domestic animals, as 

 shown by the animals themselves. But here I am met by 

 contrary views. Mr. Hubbard Winslow, whose text-book on 

 mental philosophy is well known, advances the idea that 

 animals have no reason, but only instinct; that reason and 

 instinct are set off against each other in the animal and human 

 races ; that man has rational powers to guide him, while 

 animals have those of instinct. He traces some of the differ- 

 ences between reason and instinct, thus: "1. Instinct is 

 mature at once ; reason matures gradually. 2. Instinct is a 

 blind impulse; reason is a reflective power. 3. Instinct is 

 limited; reason is universal. Indeed, that the entire range 

 of instinct embraces only four objects, — nutrition, protection, 

 motion, propagation^'' ; while "reason, on the contrary, is 

 applied in all directions, and embraces all subjects." 



Now, I contend, that however correct the foregoing defini- 

 tions of the two words may be, and however true it is that all 

 that is accorded to man is properly done, full justice is not 

 meted out to the mere animal tribes. This author does 

 indeed hold that man has something in him in the nature of 

 "instinct," and I shall endeavor to show, as intimated, that, 

 on the other hand, the animal creation possess elements of 

 nature which, in character, if not in number or degree, answer 

 to some, at least, of what are styled faculties of the human mind. 



Professor Haven, before referred to, in his work on mental 

 science, advances views quite similar to those of the last- 

 named writer. While on the subject of " instinct," he at first 

 admits the idea of intelligence of some kind in brutes, as well 

 as in the human species. He says, " How far the two resem- 

 ble each other, and how far they differ, it is not easy to 



