FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 287 



and liberty to act under it given, the mere animals in question, 

 on the other hand, having no such revelation, that we know 

 of, cannot be supposed to have moral faculties, which would 

 imply moral accountability, and the awards of approval for 

 obedience, and condemnation for sin, or disobedience. 



There is another thing these animals do not possess, and 

 the lack of which does not seem to be computed by these 

 writers, and that is the power of speech. Did they have this, 

 it would be much easier for those who now merely theorize 

 upon the subject, to tell how much real intelligence these 

 creatures possess. Some of them do almost talk, and so far 

 as we can understand their language, indicate much more of 

 real intelligence than the two writers from whose opinions we 

 dissent concede to them. 



Without pretending to follow the most approved order in 

 the arrangement (and I find others differ as to this), I will 

 here name some of the more prominent manifestations or 

 activities of the human mind denominated faculties. Take 

 the following: perception, conception, imagination, reason or 

 the reasoning power, reflection, memory, judgment, will 

 (which includes desire), attention (accompanied by medita- 

 tion), intuition. I will begin with the last named. 



One has said that " reason is instinct in man." At this I 

 demur. But it is admitted, I think, on all hands, that man 

 has something in his mechanism properly called instinct, 

 although it is said to be in some respects weak. And yet in 

 the craving for food by the child, and in that which tells him 

 how to obtain it, it is certainly quite apparent. But I would 

 say that that faculty of our mind which bears the greatest 

 resemblance to instinct in the animal is intuition. Intuition, 

 or the intuitive power, is that which calls into use first pres- 

 entations and primary ideas. It is the first thought or 

 principle which the mind grasps without reflection or reason- 

 ing of any kind. And, as an intellectual element, does it not 

 answer to "instinct" in the mere animal, taking Professor 

 Haven's definition for our guide ? He maintains that instinct 

 is a law of action in the l)rute, which comes to him without 

 reflection, without his own agency, and yet that it is that 

 upon which he acts. So we, after receiving them, act upon 

 our own intuitions. But I must just here take exception 



