358 READINGS IN BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE 



diseases in the American wheat crop for the period 1919 to 1937 averaged 

 slightly more than 10 per cent, per year. Let us assume that our potential 

 4,000 bushel wheat crop was subjected to disease to this extent, and that 

 10 per cent, or 400 bushels were lost through disease. All of the costs of 

 production are unchanged; it still cost 3,200 bushels to produce the 3,600 

 bushel yield. The bills could not be paid with the diseased grain or that 

 which failed to materialize. Ten per cent, disease in the field did not strike 

 the farmer as an unusual or serious loss; yet, the 10 per cent, field loss cost 

 him one-half of his profit. 



We hear much today of the misfortunes of the American farmer as com- 

 pared with the greater security and prosperity of the American Business 

 man. We blame this difference on many factors, but is not a part of the 

 explanation in the differences in methods between the two? To the business 

 man a loss of one per cent, in his industry through waste is a vital loss, one 

 to be corrected. The story is that Mr. Rockefeller, in an inspection of one 

 of his factories, noticed a machine dripping solder on oil cans. He asked 

 and found that the superintendent had never tested the exact amount of 

 solder needed. Mr. Rockefeller counted and found that the machine was 

 applying 39 drops of solder per can. An experiment was devised on the 

 spot; it was discovered that 38 drops would suffice. In a year's time the 

 concern had been saved $10,000 worth of solder and time through this 

 slight economy. No business a fraction as wasteful as the average farm 

 could survive without subsidy in the face of its competition. When the 

 American farmer learns to regard his farming as the business man regards 

 his business, we venture to predict that the need for farm relief and crop 

 subsidy will be materially decreased. 



When watermelon wilt first appeared in Florida melon plantings a few 

 growers reported the new disease that was killing the vines, and the Experi- 

 ment Station undertook to find means of checking the disease. The attitude 

 of some of the growers in the early 1920's savors strongly of 1940 agri- 

 cultural philosophy. They said: "If this disease is eradicated, there will be 

 a surplus of watermelons; the price will be lowered, and our profits will 

 lessen. We do not approve of efforts to prevent wilt." But wilt is not a 

 disease that can be trifled with. A few years after its introduction, affected 

 land became useless for melons; losses of 90 per cent, of the crop were not 

 uncommon. The industry must move on to new land, expensive to clear. 

 The abandoned land went back into scrub-oak, since it was not suitable 

 for other crops. 



And now a new thought crystallized in the growers' minds. A profitable 

 industry was seriously threatened. They carried their problem to the Flor- 

 ida Legislature, and in 1929 funds were appropriated for a study of wilt. 

 At the Experiment Station a watermelon wilt project was initiated, and by 

 1936 Dr. Walker of that Station announced that the "Leesburg," a new 

 and desirable wilt-resistant melon, was available to the growers. 



