410 READINGS IN BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE 



purpose or purposer could be complex enough to take into consideration 

 all of the complexities that actually occur. How could such successive series 

 of so many simultaneous complexities be integrated into a single purpose? 

 One might as easily argue that the world is too complex to have been pur- 

 posed as to argue that complexity presupposes purpose. Furthermore, if 

 the purpose is at least as complex as its purposed product, what purpose 

 could there be in duplicating the complexity? 



Evolution. Although the idea of biological evolution was once ardently 

 opposed by those who believed it inconsistent with the idea of world pur- 

 posiveness, it is now appealed to as one of the strongest evidences of world 

 purposiveness. "Evolution seems directed toward certain ends. Mere com- 

 plexity may not presuppose purposiveness, but complexity that is going 

 somewhere does. Evidence of direction is plentiful. Each sta^e of the re- 

 productive cycle seems to serve the next stage. Each species that developed 

 seems to have served as a basis for the development of later species. The 

 history of biological development toward, and to, purposive man surely 

 must have been for a purpose." Some biologists even appeal to world pur- 

 posiveness for proof of the previous existence of what some call "missino- 

 links." These had to be in order to fulfill the purpose obvious in biological 

 evolution. "Furthermore," some say, "this is a world in which the fit sur- 

 vive, and since evolution has been rather consistently toward those beings 

 which are more purposive surely the superior success in survival of the 

 more purposive beings argues for world purposiveness." 



Critics accustomed to defending biological evolution in non-teleological 

 terms may be somewhat taken aback by this appeal of teleologists to evolu- 

 tion. However, upon recovery, they contend that biological evolution has 

 been, and for the most part still is explained without appealing to world 

 purpose. Thus the idea of purpose is not necessarily to evolution. That 

 evolution has direction may be admitted, but that direction always implies 

 purpose may be refuted by pointing out that anything that goes anywhere 

 goes in some direction. The wind blows first in one direction and then in 

 another; but this is no evidence of change in purpose or of purposiveness 

 of any sort. Furthermore, if evolution of species serves a purpose, why have 

 some species developed only to become extinct? Some have developed not 

 merely to lay the foundation for higher species in the line of development 

 of man, but for other lines of development which eventually cease. Do some 

 purposes end? Is it a part of the world purpose that some purposes end? 

 Is such purpose as the world as a whole is supposed to have also endable? 



Critics point out further that multitudes of simple species continue to 

 exist to survive, as well as complex and more purposive species. Thus, ap- 

 parently, development in purposiveness is not essential to survival. Likewise, 

 even if it be granted more purposive beings survive better than less pur- 

 posive beings, still it would not follow that such superior success in sur- 

 vival is for a purpose. Survival of purpose does not imply survival for a 



