BIOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY 4I5 



know, even if it could be demonstrated that everything in the part of the 

 world which we do know is purposive, it still would not follow either that 

 the rest of the world is purposive or that the world as a whole has a pur- 

 pose." 



Universal agreement. "People of all times and places have believed that 

 the world is purposive. Except for a few oddities, everyone believes that 

 the world has a purpose. Can such a great majority be in error?" 



Normal rejoinder is that popular agreement is no safe proof of truth of 

 any belief. For thousands of years people agreed falsely that the earth is 

 flat. Likewise all people naturally believe that color exists in things inde- 

 pendently of persons who see it; yet scientists tell us that color as experi- 

 enced is not really out there, even though naturally we must continue to 

 act as if it were. Such illusion is convenient, useful, natural, and universal, 

 but not for those reasons true. Popular consensus is indicative not so much 

 of cosmic teleology as of anthropomorphic teleology. People believe that 

 the world is purposive, not because the world as a whole has a purpose, 

 but because people are purposive and tend to interpret other things as if 

 they were like people. This accounts for universal agreement about world 

 purposiveness at least as adequately as does the theory that the world as a 

 whole has a purpose. Furthermore, who knows what the popular consensus 

 is? No poll of opinion on this question has ever been taken. No one can say 

 with certainty that everyone does believe that the world has a purpose, 

 certainly not with regard to those of the past who can no longer be polled, 

 nor those of the future not yet pollable. 



Fragviatism. Many pragmatists define truth thus: "Those beliefs which 

 work successfully, which are useful in adjusting ourselves to our environ- 

 ment or in solving our problems, are true. And those beliefs which work 

 most successfully are most true." Teleologists who accept this pragmatic 

 definition of truth say, "The belief that the world has a purpose works 

 successfully and therefore is true. Furthermore, people who have faith in 

 world purposiveness get along better and are happier than those who do 

 not. Thus, it works more successfully and thus is more true." 



"But," say mechanists, "such success of teleologists is due to the fact 

 that they haven't yet tried to use their belief in areas where it won't work 

 so successfully. Everyone has some ideas which work well for a while or 

 in certain areas, but which have to be given up when used in wider areas 

 or over a longer period of time. Teleologists are simply less-experienced 

 than the mechanists." Using exactly the same definition of truth, some 

 mechanists seek to "turn the tables" by saying that the belief in mechanism 

 works better than the belief in teleology. Appeal is made to the comparative 

 adequacies of the teleological and mechanistic hypotheses in promoting 

 scientific progress. Mechanists claim that most science presupposes mecha- 

 nism and the progress of science stands as testimony of the superior success 

 of the mechanistic hypothesis. The history of scientific progress is a sue- 



