280 REALITY 



moment. Consciousness is not sharply defined, but 

 fades into subconsciousness; and beyond that we must 

 postulate something indefinite but yet continuous with 

 our mental nature. This I take to be the world-stuff. 

 We liken it to our conscious feelings because, now that 

 we are convinced of the formal and symbolic character of 

 the entities of physics, there is nothing else to liken it to. 



It is sometimes urged that the basal stuff of the world 

 should be called "neutral stuff" rather than "mind- 

 stuff", since it is to be such that both mind and matter 

 originate from it. If this is intended to emphasise that 

 only limited islands of it constitute actual minds, and 

 that even in these islands that which is known mentally 

 is not equivalent to a complete inventory of all that may 

 be there, I agree. In fact I should suppose that the 

 self-knowledge of consciousness is mainly or wholly a 

 knowledge which eludes the inventory method of de- 

 scription. The term "mind-stuff" might well be amended; 

 but neutral stuff seems to be the wrong kind of amend- 

 ment. It implies that we have two avenues of approach 

 to an understanding of its nature. We have only one 

 approach, namely, through our direct knowledge of 

 mind. The supposed approach through the physical 

 world leads only into the cycle of physics, where we run 

 round and round like a kitten chasing its tail and never 

 reach the world-stuff at all. 



I assume that we have left the illusion of substance 

 so far behind that the word "stuff" will not cause any 

 misapprehension. I certainly do not intend to materialise 

 or substantialise mind. Mind is — but you know what 

 mind is like, so why should I say more about its nature? 

 The word "stuff" has reference to the function it has 

 to perform as a basis of world-building and does not 

 imply any modified view of its nature. 



