302 CAUSATION 



of a particular throw is not marked in the dice; never- 

 theless it is strictly causal (apart perhaps from the 

 human element involved in throwing the dice) being de- 

 termined by the external influences which are concerned. 

 Our own position at this stage is that future develop- 

 ments of physics may reveal such causal marks (either 

 in the atom or in the influences outside it) or it may not. 

 Hitherto whenever we have thought we have detected 

 causal marks in natural phenomena they have always 

 proved spurious, the apparent determinism having come 

 about in another way. Therefore we are inclined to 

 regard favourably the possibility that there may be no 

 causal marks anywhere. 



But, it will be said, it is inconceivable that an atom 

 can be so evenly balanced between two alternative 

 courses that nowhere in the world as yet is there any 

 trace of the ultimately deciding factor. This is an ap- 

 peal to intuition and it may fairly be countered with 

 another appeal to intuition. I have an intuition much 

 more immediate than any relating to the objects of the 

 physical world; this tells me that nowhere in the world 

 as yet is there any trace of a deciding factor as to 

 whether I am going to lift my right hand or my left. 

 It depends on an unfettered act of volition not yet made 

 or foreshadowed.* My intuition is that the future is 

 able to bring forth deciding factors which are not 

 secretly hidden in the past. 



The position is that the laws governing the micro- 

 scopic elements of the physical world — individual 

 atoms, electrons, quanta — do not make definite pre- 

 dictions as to what the individual will do next. I am 



* It is fair to assume the trustworthiness of this intuition in answering 

 an argument which appeals to intuition; the assumption would beg the 

 question if we were urging the argument independently. 



