35o CONCLUSION 



convictions, which seem parallel with the unreasoning 

 trust in reason which is at the basis of mathematics, with 

 an innate sense of the fitness of things which is at the 

 basis of the science of the physical world, and with an 

 irresistible sense of incongruity which is at the basis of 

 the justification of humour. Or perhaps it is not so much 

 a question of asserting the validity of these convictions 

 as of recognising their function as an essential part of 

 our nature. We do not defend the validity of seeing 

 beauty in a natural landscape; we accept with gratitude 

 the fact that we are so endowed as to see it that way. 



It will perhaps be said that the conclusion to be 

 drawn from these arguments from modern science, is 

 that religion first became possible for a reasonable 

 scientific man about the year 1927. If we must consider 

 that tiresome person, the consistently reasonable man, 

 we may point out that not merely religion but most of 

 the ordinary aspects of life first became possible for him 

 in that year. Certain common activities (e.g. falling in 

 love) are, I fancy, still forbidden him. If our expectation 

 should prove well founded that 1927 has seen the final 

 overthrow of strict causality by Heisenberg, Bohr, Born 

 and others, the year will certainly rank as one of the 

 greatest epochs in the development of scientific philo- 

 sophy. But seeing that before this enlightened era men 

 managed to persuade themselves that they had to mould 

 their own material future notwithstanding the yoke of 

 strict causality, they might well use the same modus 

 vivendi in religion. 



This brings us to consider the view often pontifically 

 asserted that there can be no conflict between science 

 and religion because they belong to altogether different 

 realms of thought. The implication is that discussions 

 such as we have been pursuing are superfluous. But it 



