SPACE 19 



exactly to the starting-point, and, in this way, to determine 

 the position of various objects in space. If, in looking for 

 objects, we were to roll our eyes from side to side in a com- 

 pletely uncontrolled way, intolerable confusion would result, 

 from which we would flee away into darkness. Only very 

 gradually, by having recourse to the external direction-signs 

 with their local signs, could we learn again how to orientate 

 ourselves in space. 



Since it has been demonstrated that, after removal of 

 single semicircular canals, disturbances in the movements 

 occur in quite definite directions, I consider that Cyon's 

 theory is proved in its essential point. From his theory, Cyon 

 has drawn the conclusion that the directions of space are to 

 be reckoned among the sense-qualities, and that space in 

 Kant's sense should not be put with the forms of intuition, 

 for it itself must first be formed. In this I see only an 

 apparent contradiction. If, with Kant, we make the con- 

 structive activity of the subject the very centre of our con- 

 sideration, then we can very well imagine that the business 

 of construction (and apperception is nothing more or less 

 than this) first creates the forms of intuition, and then pro- 

 ceeds to make use of them. As has already been emphasised, 

 we know nothing about the real organisation of our mind. 

 Only through the activity of experience are the three factors 

 revealed which Kant discovered, namely shaping power, 

 material and law. With the beginning of experience, these 

 three first form space as a form of intuition, and space then 

 yields the general laws for all further experience. Un- 

 doubtedly we know more about the forming of space than 

 Kant did ; but everything he said about space as the means 

 whereby we construct external experience, retains its full 

 value. 



With the first movement of our limbs, our inner experi- 

 ence begins, and the first direction-signs are manifested. 



