I20 THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 



that the impulse-sequences are in some way or other laid 

 down in the brain by nervous structure. 



This way of regarding the world reduces man to a machine, 

 endowed by chance with consciousness, while all other animals 

 are able to get along quite well without it. 



Instinct would find no place either, and, in spite of the 

 non-demonstrable nervous organisation, would have to be 

 interpreted as a highly complicated reflex action. 



It all depends on whether we can explain the life of animals 

 by the presence of a framework conformable with plan and 

 analogous to that of a machine. We shall deal with this 

 more fully later on. 



THE FRAMEWORK 



It is a remarkable fact that, while the assertion that a 

 machine may be regarded as living organism excites general 

 contradiction, the opposite assertion, i.e. that we may com- 

 pare living beings with machines, finds many supporters. 

 The contradiction in this becomes less obvious if we express 

 the two statements in another way. From the statement 

 ■* machines have the properties of the living," we shall at 

 once dissent ; on the other hand, the statement " living 

 beings have mechanical properties " is certain to meet with 

 general agreement. 



It sounds positively ridiculous to maintain that a loco- 

 motive with an optical apparatus is a kind of horse ; but to 

 compare a horse with a locomotive is very tempting. 



As a matter of fact, it is impossible to get at animal action 

 from the counter-actions of implements, even by very careful 

 selection and the most delicate interweavings. All counter- 

 actions, however complicated they are thought to be, have 

 reference to a human action, and consequently remain de- 

 pendent. To unite them into an independent whole, we must 



