136 THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 



event observed by him (as in the case of an animal influenced 

 by an external object) outside the frame created by his own 

 subjectivity. He is always dealing with events that take 

 place in his space and in his time and with his qualities. 



Just as we referred physico-chemical processes to our own 

 qualities, so we can never treat biological processes otherwise 

 than on this basis. 



If we consider the process, such as an implement influenc- 

 ing an animal in the direction its movement takes, we must 

 first and foremost analyse the implement by breaking it up 

 into its properties and looking for its rule of function, so as 

 to decide which of the properties serves the animal as indica- 

 tion, or whether a function-rule belonging to the animal itself 

 is employed in that way. Thus our research is everywhere 

 limited by our own qualities and capacities. 



We can indeed show that Paramecium does not use a 

 function-rule as indication, and hence has no implements in 

 its sensed-world. We can show that it does not use outlines 

 as indications, and so has neither objects nor material things 

 in its sensed-world. Further, we can show that the most 

 diverse properties, which for us form very different qualities, 

 fuse into one single indication : but what qualities this forms 

 in the mind of Paramecium passes our comprehension. As 

 biologists we can avoid these unanswerable questions, since 

 our inquiry is not directed towards the content of the various 

 qualities or mark-signs, but only towards their employment 

 as indications. '^ 



This task devolving on the indications is clearly dis- 

 tinguishable from that of the stimuli and of the qualities, 

 and thus assumes a central position in biology, which makes 

 it necessary for us to discuss in detail the theory of indications. 



